Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal

Lara B. Aknin University of British Columbia Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh McGill University

Elizabeth W. Dunn and John F. Helliwell University of British Columbia Justine Burns University of Cape Town

Robert Biswas-Diener Positive Acorn, Milwaukie, Oregon Imelda Kemeza Mbarara University of Science and Technology

Paul Nyende Makerere University Claire E. Ashton-James University of Groningen

Michael I. Norton Harvard University

This research provides the first support for a possible psychological universal: Human beings around the world derive emotional benefits from using their financial resources to help others (*prosocial spending*). In Study 1, survey data from 136 countries were examined and showed that prosocial spending is associated with greater happiness around the world, in poor and rich countries alike. To test for causality, in Studies 2a and 2b, we used experimental methodology, demonstrating that recalling a past instance of prosocial spending has a causal impact on happiness across countries that differ greatly in terms of wealth (Canada, Uganda, and India). Finally, in Study 3, participants in Canada and South Africa randomly assigned to buy items for charity reported higher levels of positive affect than participants assigned to buy the same items for themselves, even when this prosocial spending did not provide an opportunity to build or strengthen social ties. Our findings suggest that the reward experienced from helping others may be deeply ingrained in human nature, emerging in diverse cultural and economic contexts.

Keywords: prosocial spending, happiness, psychological universal, prosocial behavior, well-being

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031578.supp

Warren Buffett, one of the richest people in the world, recently pledged to give away 99% of his wealth, saying that he "couldn't be happier with that decision" (Buffet, 2010). Consistent with Buffett's claim, recent research suggests that financial generosity may indeed promote happiness (e.g., Dunn, Aknin, & Norton,

2008). For Buffett, this striking act of generosity necessitated little self-sacrifice; he noted that "my family and I will give up nothing we need or want by fulfilling this 99% pledge," whereas for other people, "the dollars [they] drop into a collection plate or give to United Way mean forgone movies, dinners out, or other personal

Lara B. Aknin, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada; Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh, School of Environment and the Institute for Health and Social Policy, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Elizabeth W. Dunn, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia; John F. Helliwell, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia; Justine Burns, School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa; Robert Biswas-Diener, Positive Acorn, Milwaukie, Oregon; Imelda Kemeza, Department of Psychology, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Mbarara, Uganda; Paul Nyende, Department of Mental Health and Community Psychology, Makerere

University Institute of Psychology, Kampala, Uganda; Claire E. Ashton-James, Department of Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands; Michael I. Norton, Marketing Unit, Harvard Business School, Harvard University.

The authors thank Benjamin Bluman, Michael Gill, Anthony Harris, Steve Heine, Joe Henrich, Ara Norenzayan, Jason Riis, and Gerry Tellis for their help. The authors are also grateful to the Gallup Corporation for providing access to the Gallup World Poll data.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lara B. Aknin, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada. E-mail: laknin@sfu.ca

pleasures" (Buffett, 2010). Of course, in many parts of the world, spending one's limited financial resources on others may mean sacrificing more than just movies and dinners out. Does spending money on others promote happiness even in relatively impoverished areas of the world?

Although this question cannot be easily answered on the basis of existing empirical research—which has been conducted almost exclusively in wealthy countries such as the United States and Canada—there are theoretical reasons to expect that financial generosity should promote subjective well-being around the world. In particular, evolutionary theorists have argued that the evolution of altruistic behavior was essential in producing the large-scale social cooperation that allowed early human groups to thrive (Darwin, 1871/1982; Henrich & Henrich, 2006; Tomasello, 2009; Wilson, 1975). If the capacity for generosity favored survival in our evolutionary past, it is possible that engaging in generous behavior might produce consistent, positive feelings across diverse cultural contexts—akin to the pleasurable feelings associated with other adaptive behaviors such as eating and sexual intercourse. Building on this logic, we suggest that using financial resources to help others may yield similar emotional benefits across diverse cultural contexts, such that deriving happiness from prosocial spending is a psychological universal.

Prosocial Spending and Happiness

Although generosity can assume many forms, giving to others frequently involves sacrificing money or time (Liu & Aaker, 2008). We focused our investigation specifically on the impact of prosocial spending on happiness, which has been posited to lead to a "warm glow" on the part of givers (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Harbaugh, 1998). Providing initial evidence for the rewarding property of financial generosity, research conducted with a sample of more than 600 North Americans demonstrated that devoting more money to prosocial spending (on gifts for others and charitable donations) was correlated with greater well-being, even when controlling for income. It is important to note that this link is causal: North American students who were randomly assigned to spend a small windfall on others were significantly happier at the end of the day than those assigned to spend money on themselves (Dunn et al., 2008).

But does this relationship between prosocial spending and happiness extend beyond North American samples, emerging in both poor and rich countries? Cross-cultural research has shown that the within-country correlation between how much money individuals make and their happiness varies according to a country's average income (e.g., Deaton, 2008; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002). This suggests that the link between how individuals *spend* that money and their happiness might also differ between poor and wealthy countries. In particular, it would be reasonable to expect that the emotional benefits of spending money on others observed in North America might be diminished or even eliminated within very poor countries, where people might be more concerned with satisfying their own basic needs (Martin & Hill, 2012).

We proposed, however, that the relationship between prosocial spending and happiness is robust and occurs regardless of differences between countries in wealth or in the specific form that prosocial spending takes. Indirect support for a universal link between prosocial spending and happiness derives from a range of research traditions. Children as young as 2 years old show a variety of prosocial behaviors, such as sharing, helping, and comforting others (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Both human infants and chimpanzees will provide instrumental help to a stranger even when no reward can be expected for helping (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), and children as young as 2 years old exhibit increased happiness when giving a valued resource away (Aknin, Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012), suggesting that humans and our nearest evolutionary relatives may find helping others inherently rewarding. Similarly, experiences of acute stress increase prosocial behavior in men, supporting the possibility that kind acts offer emotional or recuperative benefits (von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, & Henrichs, 2012). Among older adults, providing help to others predicts decreased risk of morbidity and mortality (Brown, Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003; Brown, Consedine, & Magai, 2005). In addition, prosocial behavior has been linked to a set of brain regions implicated in the experience of reward, including the orbital frontal cortex and ventral striatum (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Moll et al., 2006; Tankersley, Stowe, & Huettel, 2007), again suggesting a basic reinforcing property for generosity. Thus, while there is no question that individuals often behave selfishly, previous research provides suggestive evidence that human beings may also have a proclivity to experience emotional benefits from giving to others.

Psychological Universals

Psychological universals are defined as "core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere" (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005, p. 763) and can be classified into several categories, including *accessibility universals*, which appear everywhere with little or no cultural variation, and *functional universals*, which are potentially detectable in all cultures but that may vary in degree of expression according to the cultural context. Norenzayan and Heine (2005) argued that few psychological phenomena are likely to meet the stringent threshold for classification as accessibility universals (i.e., absence of any meaningful cultural variation). We proposed that the positive relationship between prosocial spending and wellbeing is a functional universal.

To illustrate the concept of a functional universal, Norenzayan and Heine (2005) pointed to Buss's (1989) cross-cultural survey of gender differences in mate preference. Buss (1989) found that men and women seek distinct characteristics in mates: men seek chaste and attractive women, whereas women seek financially successful men. Although these preferences are detectable in most countries around the world, there is substantial variation across cultures (e.g., gender differences in seeking financial success are twice as large in Nigeria as in Belgium). Thus, while gender is related to mating cue preferences around the world, the size of the effect varies—reflecting a functional universal. In addition, the specific manifestations of mating cues vary across cultures (e.g., a large herd of cattle may signal financial success in parts of Africa, whereas owning a beachside mansion may provide a parallel signal in North America). Similarly, we anticipated that prosocial spending would be related to happiness across diverse cultures but that both the size of this relationship and the specific manifestations of prosocial spending would vary across cultures.

Norenzayan and Heine (2005) noted that the field of psychology lacks a "a set of agreed upon methodological criteria by which we

can consider universals," such that "researchers have largely relied on appeals to their readers' intuitions as to what kind of data would strengthen the case for universality" (p. 766). In response, Norenzayan and Heine (2005) proposed that researchers should gather evidence for universals by (a) surveying individuals across a diverse array of the world's countries (which generally necessitates the use of brief questionnaire-based correlational analyses) and (b) conducting experimental studies within two or three cultures that differ substantially on key dimensions.

In the present research, we applied this "gold standard" strategy of converging evidence to test the hypothesis that prosocial spending is linked to subjective well-being across cultures. Although the countries we studied differ on numerous dimensions, we were primarily interested in the key dimension of national-level income, which has been shown to play a critical moderating role in shaping the relationship between individuals' wealth and well-being within countries, as discussed earlier; therefore, we examined the emotional benefits of prosocial spending among individuals from countries with various ranges of income, extending previous research by examining the impact of prosocial behavior around the world. We expected that the relationship between prosocial spending and well-being would represent a functional universal, such that spending money on others would be positively associated with happiness in most countries around the world, though this relationship may vary in strength. Indeed, if prosocial spending is manifested differently in diverse cultures—akin to financial success cues described earlier—but linked to greater happiness across them, this would provide strong evidence that the warm glow of giving is a robust component of human psychology.

Defining Happiness and Prosocial Spending

Following Diener and colleagues (e.g., Diener, 2000; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Diener & Scollon, 2003), we viewed subjective well-being (SWB) as including both affective (e.g., positive emotion) and cognitive (e.g., life satisfaction) components. Diener and Scollon (2003) noted, "Whether emotions or cognitions, all forms of SWB represent the person's evaluation of his or her life, whether at the moment or across time" (p. 4). Because no single measure of SWB captures all facets of this broad construct (Diener, 1984), researchers in this area recommend using multiple measures of SWB in order to investigate whether similar effects emerge (Biswas-Diener, Kashdan, & King, 2009; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008). We adopt this broad approach to SWB in the present research assessing both the affective and cognitive components of SWB with multiple measures across studies—and we use the terms happiness and SWB interchangeably.

Also, following past research (Aknin, Dunn, & Norton, 2012; Aknin, Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton, 2011; Dunn et al., 2008), we defined *prosocial spending* broadly, as money spent on others. This definition includes donations to charities, gifts for friends and family, and a wide range of other expenditures, such as buying coffee for an acquaintance. Of course, the behaviors people undertake when engaging in prosocial spending may also trigger additional routes to well-being, such as fostering social relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diener & Oishi, 2005; Diener & Seligman, 2002) and acquiring new life experiences (Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). However, we argue—and later provide experi-

mental evidence to demonstrate—that the emotional benefits of prosocial spending can accrue above and beyond the contribution of these previously documented sources of well-being. In addition, although we defined prosocial spending broadly, we narrowed our operationalization in Study 3 to examine the emotional consequences of purchasing material items for unknown recipients in the absence of social praise, design features that decrease the likelihood that the well-being benefits of prosocial spending are entirely due to creating social connections or buying experiences. Note that the definition of prosocial spending is behavioral rather than motivational: while prosocial behavior has been defined as an act performed to benefit another person (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), altruism is defined as "a motivational state with the end goal of increasing another's welfare" (Batson & Shaw, 1991, p. 108). Given the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in assessing the underlying reasons for behavior, we focused our investigation on the emotional benefits of spending money on others, rather than on people's underlying motivations for performing these actions.

The Present Studies

We present four studies that use multiple methods to examine whether humans around the world experience hedonic benefits from generous spending. In Study 1, we conducted correlational analyses to demonstrate a relationship between prosocial spending and well-being across 136 countries that spanned a wide range of income levels. We then narrowed our focus to four of these countries—Canada (Studies 2a and 3), Uganda (Studies 2a), India (Study 2b), and South Africa (Study 3)—that differ on the key dimension of income. In Studies 2a and 2b, we show that recalling a past instance of prosocial spending has a consistent and causal impact on happiness in three economically diverse countries: Canada, Uganda, and India. Finally, in Study 3, we show that buying a small gift for charity leads to higher levels of positive affect than buying the same gift for oneself in Canada and South Africa, even when no one else is aware of the generous act and the benefactor has no contact with the beneficiary.

Study 1: Correlational Study

Method

Sample. To examine the correlation between prosocial spending and subjective well-being within a large number of countries, we used data collected from 136 countries between 2006 and 2008 as part of the Gallup World Poll (GWP; total N = 234,917, $M_{\rm age} = 38$ years, SD = 17; 49% male). The sample represents over 95% of the world's adult population (age 15 and older) and provides an exceptionally large and diverse snapshot. The data are collected from randomly selected, nationally representative samples with a mean size of 1,321 individuals per country (SD = 730, range = 141-4.437). These samples include residents from cities, towns, and rural areas, thus representing the population of an entire country. In wealthier regions, respondents are selected through random-digit dialing for a 30-min interview. In poorer regions, respondents are selected with random geographic sampling for a 1-hr face-to-face interview. All survey materials are presented in the local language; materials are back-translated (e.g., from Eng-

lish to German and then from German to English) to ensure accuracy.

Measures.

Prosocial spending. The GWP asks respondents whether they have donated money to charity in the past month. We used dichotomous responses (yes/no) to this question as our index of prosocial spending.

Subjective well-being (SWB). Two questions in the GWP measure respondents' subjective assessment of their life overall: First, in most countries and waves of the GWP, respondents are asked to evaluate their lives using the Cantril ladder (Cantril, 1965). Ratings on this scale require respondents to imagine a ladder with 11 steps (from 0, worst possible life, to 10, best possible life) and report which step best represents their life. Second, in 2007 and 2008, respondents in approximately half of the countries completed a single-item measure of life satisfaction, on which respondents rate how satisfied they are with their life as a whole on an 11-point scale- (0, dissatisfied, to 10, satisfied). Consistent with recent research (Helliwell, Barrington-Leigh, Harris, & Huang, 2010), we used each individual's response(s) to one or both of these questions—taking the average when both responses were present—as our measure of SWB.

Income and demographics. The GWP records respondents' household income. We used the natural logarithm of household income in our within-country estimates, which do not rely on international exchange rate or purchasing power calculations. Where we did compare incomes at the international level, we used the average GDP per capita expressed in 2007 U.S. dollars, based on purchasing power parity values from the World Bank (see Deaton, 2008, for similar methods and income comparisons, including a discussion of the empirically preferred logarithmic form of income). As an additional measure of income and material consumption, respondents are asked if there has been a time in the last year when they have had trouble securing food for their family. Respondents also provide demographic information, including gender, age, marital status, and education level.

Results

Within-country equation. We examined (using Stata software Version 10) the relationship between SWB and prosocial spending while controlling for household income and whether respondents had lacked enough money to buy food in the past 12 months. We also controlled for demographic variables (age, gender, marital status, and education level). To begin with the most stringent test of universality, we estimated a regression equation separately for each country, pooled over years 2006–2008. The equation estimated separately for each country is of the form:

$$SWB_{i} = c_{0} + a \log(Income_{i}) + b Donated_{i} + c Food_{i} + X_{i}' d$$
$$+ g dNoSWL_{i} + \sum yrh_{vr}dWave_{vr,i} + \varepsilon_{l} \quad (1)$$

for individual i. The coefficient b represents the relationship between individual life evaluation (SWB_i) and donating to charity (Donated_i), while controlling for household income (Income_i), reported food inadequacy (Food_i), an indicator for each wave (year) of the Gallup World Poll, the remaining demographic variables (X_i), and an indicator (dNoSWL_i) to account for whether one

or two measures of life evaluation were available for the individual. Thus, this equation examines the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB reports at the individual level while controlling for household income, food inadequacy, age, gender, marital status, and education across various waves of the GWP and measures of well-being.

The relationship between prosocial spending and SWB is positive in 120 out of 136 countries included in the Gallup World Poll, with this relationship reaching traditional levels of significance (p < .05) in some 59% of these 120 countries (Figure 1; see also Tables S2 and S3 in the online supplemental materials for individual country estimates). In a pooled global estimate, the prosocial spending coefficient, b = 0.27, p < .03, exceeds half the coefficient of log income, b = 0.41, p < .03. Thus, in this model, donating to charity has a similar relationship to SWB as a doubling of household income. That is, in order for someone who does not report prosocial spending to have the same predicted SWB as someone who does, their income would need to be twice as high (other things equal).2 Although rates of prosocial spending are higher in wealthier countries, r(134) = 0.54, p < .001, the size of the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB that emerges within countries is unrelated to rates of donation, r(134) = -.10, p = .23, or to the countries' mean incomes, r(134) = -.09, p = .31, suggesting that generous financial behavior is linked to well-being in poor and rich countries alike.

Although these findings point to the robustness of the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB in economically and culturally diverse areas of the world, this relationship failed to reach significance in a considerable number of individual countries. Because our ability to detect a significant relationship between prosocial spending and SWB within each country is limited by the sample size at the country level, we conducted a power analysis for this coefficient using Stata software Version 10; given the median variance explained by the donation variable across countries, a sample of 1,900 respondents would be required to produce a significant (p < .05) within-country coefficient 80% of the time. Applying this threshold, we found that among the subset of 23 countries with samples of at least 1,900 respondents, the estimate of prosocial spending is significantly positive in 20 (87%).

Another means of maximizing power while encompassing the full diversity of our sample is to aggregate countries into seven

¹ Consistent with other recent research analyzing SWB data in the Gallup World Poll (Deaton, 2008; Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010), we chose to utilize ordinary least squares regression analyses. This analytic strategy has been validated against a number of other methods for analyzing the determinants of happiness (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004). In a later section, we extend our ordinary least squares estimates to achieve a multilevel model allowing for variation in the main effect across countries in accordance with a national-level variable. That is, we use a set of interaction terms between individual donations and several indicator variables denoting whether a given national variable (e.g., gross domestic product/capita) is in a given range.

² Although the raw coefficient of log income is higher than that of prosocial spending, the logarithmic form of income means that large multiplicative changes in income are required to have a large effect on predicted SWB. Quantitatively, in order to increase SWB by as much as the predicted effect of prosocial spending, log income would need to increase by the ratio of coefficients, .27/.41 = .66. Therefore, income would need to increase by a factor of exp(.27/.41) = 1.93.




Figure 1. World map display of prosocial spending coefficients.

major cultural/geographic regions used by Gallup in designing its World Poll (see Helliwell et al., 2010). When averaged within each region, the estimates for prosocial spending are significant in each: Africa ($b=0.29,\ p<.001$), Asia ($b=0.20,\ p<.001$), Europe ($b=0.27,\ p<.001$), the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ($b=0.33,\ p<.001$), Latin America ($b=0.22,\ p<.001$), Persia and the Middle East ($b=0.18,\ p<.05$), and the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand ($b=0.30,\ p<.001$).

It is possible that respondents' answers to the donation question may be influenced by factors such as their financial security. Although we control for income, discretionary spending can provide an alternative indicator of wealth (Rutstein & Johnson, 2004). Because charitable donations represent one form of discretionary spending, the relationship between charitable donations and happiness may in part reflect a relationship between wealth and SWB. If this is the case, then controlling for other measures of wealth or material consumption should affect the relationship between charitable donations and SWB. However, when we control for both income and food inadequacy (which provides an additional measure of material consumption) the prosocial spending coefficient (b = 0.27) is almost identical to the coefficient when these controls are absent (b = 0.26). These findings cast doubt on the possibility that prosocial spending predicts happiness primarily because it captures individual differences in wealth.4

Multilevel modeling. While the previous analyses demonstrate that the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB is positive in most individual countries and all major regions of the world, we do not suggest that it emerges to precisely the same extent everywhere. Rather, we hypothesized that the relationship is robust throughout diverse regions of the world and, more specifically, robust in both poor and rich countries. To examine the role of national-level income more thoroughly in a multilevel framework, we next estimated a global (pooled) model in which the effect of prosocial spending is allowed to vary nonparametrically (i.e., without assuming any particular relationship, such as a linear one) as a function of national-level income, again using Stata software Version 10.

$$SWB_{i} = c_{0} + a \log(Income_{i}) + b (GDP)Donated_{i} + c Food_{i}$$
$$+ X'_{i} d + g dNoSWL_{i} + \Sigma yrh_{vr}dWave_{vr,i} + \varepsilon_{l}$$
(2)

In Equation 2, the prosocial spending coefficient b may vary across countries as a function of national income (measured as purchasing power per capita). The estimate of Equation 2 is carried out as a standard linear regression in which the prosocial spending variable is set to interact with indicators for consecutive ranges of the national income variable. This equation allowed us to examine whether national income moderates the emotional benefits of prosocial spending across countries. Figure 2 displays the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB across a range of country incomes (measured as mean purchasing power per capita). In this figure, we averaged responses from multiple countries, thereby increasing the sample size, and found that the estimated prosocial spending coefficient was then uniformly and significantly positive (p < .001); indeed, it was remarkably uniform in magnitude along the entire range of incomes. Although the positive relationship between prosocial spending and well-being clearly varied in size when each country was examined independently (as shown in Figure 1), these results indicated that the size of this relationship is consistent across poor and rich countries overall (Figure 2).

Exploratory analyses. Although we were primarily interested in examining whether the link between prosocial spending and happiness was robust for individuals and nations across the income spectrum, we also explored whether this link remained significant when we controlled for other variables related to well-being. Specifically, we selected three variables available in the GWP that were identified in a recent report as leading predictors of well-

³ These means are calculated using confidence weights from the country-level estimates and are shown in Table S2 in the supplemental online materials. We also carried out pooled estimates directly at the region level and found highly similar results, again significant in each region (Table S5 in supplemental online materials).

⁴ The relationship between prosocial spending and SWB also remains significant if we estimate a simpler equation that lacks demographic information as well (see Table S4 in the supplemental online materials).




Figure 2. Each vertical line represents the 95% confidence interval for the prosocial spending coefficient within an individual country (from Equation 1); countries of particular interest are in bold. These lines are graphed in order of country income (in 2007 purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars), from low to high. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the prosocial spending coefficients in each range of national income. The dashed lines show the extension of the range of the smallest and largest income groups estimated.

being around the world (Layard, Clark, & Senik, 2012): social support, perceived freedom, and perceived corruption. When all three individual-level variables were entered into Equation 1 simultaneously, the effect of prosocial spending on life satisfaction remained largely unchanged (b = 0.22, p < .001). Next, we explored whether differences between countries in social support, perceived freedom, or perceived corruption explained variability across countries in the relationship between prosocial spending and happiness. To do so, we estimated subjective well-being in the GWP data using a global equation like Equation 2, but replaced country-level income with each of these three variables. We conducted separate regressions for each of these three variables and examined the interaction between each variable (e.g., perceived freedom) and prosocial spending. None of the interaction terms were significant (b values from -0.17 to 0.12, ps > .10) and the prosocial spending coefficient remained at least marginally significant in all analyses (b values from 0.18 to 0.39, ps < .10). Thus, our results demonstrated that country-level variations in social support, freedom, and corruption do not explain the differences observed in the emotional rewards of prosocial spending around the world.

Discussion

Examining over 200,000 respondents drawn from 136 countries, we found that prosocial spending is linked to higher SWB around the world. This effect emerges in both poor and rich nations, although the size and significance of this relationship vary among individual countries. The variability we observed between countries suggests that this relationship does not meet the stringent threshold for classification as an accessibility universal, but the fact that this relationship is detectable in diverse regions of the world provides support for the argument

that the warm glow of giving is a functional universal (akin to the relationship between gender and mating preferences). Thus, Study 1 provides the first empirical evidence that the warm glow of prosocial spending may be a widespread component of human psychology rather than limited to affluent countries such as the United States and Canada—both characterized by a level of material wealth unimaginable throughout most of human history. The robustness of the observed relationship is particularly notable, given that prosocial spending was assessed with a one-item dichotomous measure, suggesting that the effect may prove even more ubiquitous if this construct were to be assessed with more in-depth measures tailored to each country.

Our analyses also demonstrate that the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB remains robust when controlling for demographic variables, as well as other leading predictors of SWB, including social support, perceived freedom, and perceived corruption. The robustness of this relationship notwithstanding, its strength did vary considerably between countries, and this variability was not explained by national-level differences in any of the variables we examined (income, social support, perceived freedom, perceived corruption) Thus, determining why the relationship between prosocial spending and happiness is stronger in some parts of the world than in others represents an important goal for future research.

Because Study 1 relied on correlational analyses, these findings are inevitably subject to alternative explanations, such that establishing the causal impact of prosocial spending on happiness necessitates the use of experimental design. Therefore, we next used experimental methodology and narrowed our focus to two countries, Canada and Uganda. These two counties differ substantially in terms of our key variable of interest, per capita income (with Canada falling in the top 15% and Uganda falling in the bottom 15% of countries surveyed in Study 1), as well as frequency of prosocial spending (66% of respondents reported donating in Canada vs. 13% in Uganda). In addition, moving beyond the narrow measure of prosocial spending used in Study 1-charitable giving-we broadened our operationalization of this construct in Studies 2a and 2b, assessing the different forms that prosocial spending takes in different cultural contexts. This broader construal of prosocial spending includes all types of spending on others, such as taking a friend to lunch, and provides a fuller and more ecologically valid representation of generous financial behavior. Of course, spending on others versus oneself differs on multiple dimensions; in particular, it is likely that prosocial spending is intended to foster social relationships, an independent predictor of well-being (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diener & Oishi, 2005; Diener & Seligman, 2002). We therefore assessed this construct with coder ratings (Study 2a) and self-report (Study 2b) to show that the effect of prosocial spending on happiness emerges even when intentions to build or improve a social relationship are controlled.

Study 2a: Experimental Study in Canada and Uganda

To test the causal impact of prosocial spending on happiness, we randomly assigned participants in Canada and Uganda to write about a time they had spent money on themselves (*personal spending*) or on others (*prosocial spending*). This

reminiscence-based methodology has been used successfully in previous research to study the long-term emotional consequences of real-world spending experiences (e.g., Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). We assessed participants' happiness following this task and coded their responses for the specific form that their personal and prosocial purchases had taken.

Method

Participants. A total of 820 individuals participated: 140 students from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada ($M_{age}=20.0$ years, SD=3.9; 54% females), 105 students from Mbarara University in Mbarara, Uganda ($M_{age}=21.7$ years, SD=2.6; 24% females), 382 students from Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda ($M_{age}=23.0$ years, SD=4.1; 72% females), and 193 adults from the city of Kampala, Uganda ($M_{age}=27.7$ years, SD=7.8; 51% females).

Procedure. Participants were approached on a university campus or in the city of Kampala and randomly assigned to recall a recent purchase in which they spent either 10,000 Ugandan shillings or 20 Canadian dollars on themselves (personal spending condition) or someone else (prosocial spending condition); these amounts represented approximately equal buying power in Uganda and Canada, respectively. After describing the spending experience in detail using a procedure designed to elicit vivid reminiscence (Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985), participants were asked to report their happiness on the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS), a four-item measure of subjective well-being that has been used with samples around the world ($\alpha = .70$; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). All study materials were provided in English and edited by local collaborators to ensure that questions would be comprehensible and interpreted consistently in both Canada and Uganda. Despite these methodological precautions, it is well known that people in different cultural contexts may use differential response sets in rating themselves on subjective Likert-type scales (e.g., Bond, 1988; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). Therefore, following procedures recommended to mitigate this problem (Bond, 1988; Heine, 2008; Leung & Bond, 1989), we z-scored responses on the SHS within each country prior to pooling our data across countries.⁵

Coding. Participants' spending descriptions were coded by undergraduate research assistants (RAs) blind to participants' assigned condition and happiness scores, as well as the goals of the study. All spending experiences were coded by four Canadian RAs,6 with a subset rated by a Ugandan coder to check for cross-cultural consistency in interpretation; the Ugandan coder's ratings were highly correlated with the ratings of the four Canadian coders, average r(88) = .65, p < .01. Spending descriptions were rated on three major dimensions (see Table 1): (a) the social contexts of the purchase (e.g., Was the spender trying to strengthen a social relationship with this purchase?; coded as 1 = yes or 0 = yesno), (b) to what extent the spending purchase appeared to be driven by specific spending motives (rated on a scale from 1 to 7: 1 =need vs. 7 = want or 1 = obligation vs. 7 = volition), and (c) whether the purchase included certain goods or activities (e.g., food, clothing, transportation, an experience, or medical costs or supplies; coded as 1 = included or 0 = not included). To achieve an appropriate level of interrater reliability, the RAs coded an

initial subset of spending descriptions along the dimensions listed previously and discussed their coding to resolve inconsistencies.

Results

To investigate whether prosocial (vs. personal) spending increased happiness across cultures, we submitted SHS ratings to a 2 (spending type: personal vs. prosocial) \times 2 (country: Uganda vs. Canada) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As predicted, there was a significant main effect of spending type, whereby participants randomly assigned to recall a purchase made for someone else (M=0.09, SD=1.00) reported significantly higher happiness than participants assigned to recall a purchase made for themselves (M=-0.09, SD=0.99), F(1,784)=8.21, p=.004, $\eta_p^2=.01$. The interaction of spending type and country was not significant, F(1,784)=1.88, p=.17, $\eta_p^2=.002$. Thus, participants in Canada and Uganda reported higher levels of happiness when they thought about spending money on others rather than themselves.

The higher levels of happiness reported by participants in the prosocial spending condition were not simply a result of fostering a social relationship. As expected, participants assigned to the prosocial spending condition provided spending descriptions that were rated by coders as more likely to build, F(1, 766) = 4.03, p <.05, and strengthen, F(1, 766) = 318.32, p < .001, social relationships than participants in the personal spending condition. However, adding coder ratings of either building new relationships or strengthening old relationships as a covariate to the 2 (spending type: personal vs. prosocial) × 2 (country: Uganda vs. Canada) ANOVA described previously leaves the main effect of spending condition significant. Specifically, analyses reveal that prosocial spending memories led to higher levels of happiness even when controlling for coder ratings of strengthening old relationships, F(1, 736) = 3.72, p = .05, or building new ones, <math>F(1, 736) =10.95, p = .001, suggesting that prosocial spending does not increase happiness solely by improving relationships.

While the effect of prosocial spending on happiness emerged consistently across participants in Canada and Uganda, we also examined whether these same effects emerged within each country independently. In the Canadian sample, we conducted an ANOVA to compare the happiness of participants randomly assigned to the two spending recall conditions. As expected, participants assigned to recall a previous purchase made for someone else were significantly happier (M = 0.20, SD = 0.91) than participants assigned to recall a previous purchase made for themselves (M = -0.20,

⁵ In both Studies 2a and 3, the effect of prosocial spending on happiness was substantively the same using raw happiness scores rather than standardized scores. Because the use of raw scores can produce spurious results when the effect of one variable on another is examined across cultures (for a discussion of this issue, see Bond, 1988), we report results using standardized scores.

⁶ Because the Ugandan community sample data were collected after the three student samples, these data were coded by a separate team of four Canadian RAs (also blind to participants' assigned condition, happiness scores, and goals of the study). This second group of coders applied the same coding scheme to the Ugandan community sample data to ensure that the second coding team applied the coding scheme similarly to the first team, a total of 50 spending memories drawn from the Mbaraba, Kampala, and University of British Columbia student samples were coded by the second group of coders. The two coding teams showed high levels of agreement across all items, average r(48) = .83, p < .01.

Table 1
Coder Reliabilities and Frequency Ratings by Recall Condition
and Home Country

	Type of recalled	
Coding dimension (α)	Prosocial	Personal
Purchase context		
Purchase made to strengthen an old		
relationship (.81)		
Uganda	58.7 ^a	14.4 ^b
Canada	64.2 ^a	12.9 ^b
Purchase made to build a new relationship		
(.63)		
Uganda	3.3^{a}	1.2 ^b
Canada	$3.0^{a,b}$	1.1 ^{a,b}
Purchase made in relation to negative event		
(.91)		
Uganda	14.6 ^a	1.8 ^b
Canada	0.0^{b}	$0.4^{\rm b}$
Purchase motivation		
Need vs. want (.84): $1 = need$, $7 = want$		
Uganda	4.58 ^a	4.65 ^a
Canada	6.19 ^c	5.17 ^b
Obligation vs. volition (.70): $1 = obligation$,		
7 = volition		
Uganda	5.46 ^a	5.32 ^a
Canada	6.36°	5.88 ^b
Purchase content		
Personal necessities (.74)		
Uganda	6.8 ^a	21.1 ^b
Canada	7.1 ^a	10.2^{a}
Food (.95)		
Uganda	33.7^{a}	$48.7^{\rm b}$
Canada	47.0 ^b	46.2 ^b
Transportation (.97)		
Uganda	14.8 ^a	18.2 ^a
Canada	1.5 ^b	1.5 ^b
Medical items or related costs (.94)		
Uganda	9.4 ^a	$2.2^{\rm b}$
Canada	0.0^{b}	$0.4^{\rm b}$
Clothing (.92)		
Uganda	15.9 ^a	27.0 ^b
Canada	$19.0^{a,b}$	21.2 ^{a,b}
Experience (.78)		
Uganda	17.0 ^a	21.6 ^a
Canada	15.7 ^a	14.8 ^a

Note. Superscript text denotes significant mean differences. Means with the same superscript are not significantly different from one another at the p=.05 level.

SD=1.05), F(1, 138)=5.58, p=.02, $\eta_p^2=.04$. In the Ugandan sample, a similar analysis was conducted with an additional variable indicating the subsample (student sample in Mbarara, student sample in Kampala, and community sample in Kampala). Analyses revealed that participants randomly assigned to the prosocial spending recall condition reported higher levels of happiness (M=0.07, SD=1.02) than participants assigned to the personal spending recall condition (M=-0.07, SD=0.97), F(1, 642)=5.19, p=.023, $\eta_p^2=.008$, and this main effect was not qualified by an interaction between spending condition and subsample, F(2, 642)=1.13, ns, $\eta_p^2=.004$. The main effect of subsample was significant, indicating that there were differences in happiness levels across the three Ugandan samples, F(2, 642)=8.27, p<0.01, $\eta_p^2=.025$.

Although the emotional benefits of prosocial spending emerged in both countries, the specific ways in which participants spent their money (as rated by coders) varied substantially between cultures (see Table 1 for a full breakdown). For example, when recalling a time they spent money on themselves, twice as many participants in Uganda described purchasing a personal necessity, compared with those in Canada. When recalling a time they spent money on others, almost 15% of participants in Uganda described a purchase that was made in response to a negative event, with fully 9% purchasing medical supplies or services—whereas none of the prosocial spending descriptions provided by the Canadian participants fell into these categories. Given these important national differences in specific spending experiences, it is particularly remarkable that spending money on others produced emotional benefits in both countries. Further supporting the robustness of this pattern, the main effect of spending condition on SWB remained significant when controlling in the ANOVA for the extent to which participants' purchases were motivated by need (vs. want), were obligatory (vs. volitional), represented a response to a negative event, or provided an experience (e.g., going to a movie), all $F_{\rm S} > 8.00$, all $p_{\rm S} < .005$.

Discussion

Providing converging evidence for our central hypothesis, Study 2a demonstrated that people in both Canada and Uganda reported greater happiness after recalling a time when they spent money on others rather than themselves. By asking people to recall a past spending experience, we were able to examine how people spent their own money in their everyday lives, yielding a rich data set that underscores the very different forms that prosocial spending can assume as a function of the cultural context, akin to the culturally specific mating cues described in the introduction. Given the differences we observed between countries in the specific nature of participants' spending experiences, it is particularly remarkable that prosocial spending produced benefits across both countries.

Building upon these findings, we had four primary aims in Study 2b. First, although Study 2a demonstrates that people feel happier after reflecting on a time when they spent money on others rather than themselves, the absence of a control condition makes it difficult to ascertain whether the prosocial spending condition made people feel better—as our account holds—or the personal spending condition made people feel worse. We therefore included a control condition in Study 2b in which participants were not asked to reflect on a past spending experience. Second, we extended our experimental research to a third country, recruiting a sample of Indian adults, a country where per-capita income is low and where the relationship between prosocial spending and happiness was relatively weak (though still significant) in Study 1. Third, in order to further address the possibility that relationship building drives the impact of prosocial spending on happiness, we asked participants themselves to rate the extent to which purchases served to strengthen or build social relationships—rather than relying on coders as in Study 2a. Finally, we included a broader range of well-being measures in Study 2b. Study 2a included only the SHS, which we selected because it is brief, reliable, and cross-culturally valid. The SHS was originally designed as a global, trait-level measure (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). Although trait-level measures of well-being are affected by state-like feelings (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), we believed that our manipulation likely would be detected best on a state measure specifically designed to be sensitive to slight changes in mood. Indeed, we suggest that our manipulation led people to *feel* happier, which led them to evaluate their lives as *being* happier. To document this process, we asked participants in Study 2b to complete both a measure of positive affect and the SHS, as well the life satisfaction measure from Study 1.

Study 2b: Experimental Study in India

Method

Participants. A total of 101 individuals from India ($M_{age} = 28.4$ years, SD = 8.3; range = 19–66, 43% females) completed this study online through Amazon's Mechanical Turk service; this service has been shown to produce samples comparable to other methodologies (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).

Procedure. Consistent with Study 2a, participants in the experimental conditions were assigned to recall a recent purchase in which they spent money on themselves (personal spending condition) or someone else (prosocial spending condition); those in the control condition proceeded directly to our happiness measures without recalling a past spending experience.⁷ To create a very brief measure of current positive affect for use in India, we selected the three items (excited, alert, active) that were most strongly correlated with overall positive affect scores on the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in other research we conducted in Uganda (Aknin, Dunn, Norton, & Nyende, 2012). In addition, we added the key word *happy* to create a reliable four-item index of positive affect ($\alpha = .66$). Participants then completed the SHS and the one-item life satisfaction measure from the GWP. Afterward, participants in the personal and prosocial spending conditions reported the extent to which their spending experience was intended to build or strengthen a social relationship on a single 10-point scale (0 = not at all, 9 = very much). Finally, all participants reported their demographic information.

Results and Discussion

A one-way ANOVA revealed significant between-group differences in positive affect, F(2, 96) = 3.44, p < .04, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Using least-significant-difference contrasts, we found that positive affect levels reported by participants in the control condition (M = 3.72, SD = 0.72) and personal spending condition (M = 3.64, SD = 0.49) were not significantly different from each other, p > .65; most important, participants in the prosocial spending condition reported higher levels of positive affect (M = 4.11, SD = 0.54) than participants in either of the other conditions, ps < .04. Unlike coder ratings in Study 2a, self-ratings of building and strengthening social relationships did not differ between the personal and prosocial spending conditions (p > .35). Consistent with Study 2a, however, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) confirmed that the difference between the personal and prosocial spending condition remained significant when controlling for participants' own ratings

of the extent to which their purchases had built or strengthened social relationships (p < .05).

Indirect effect of prosocial spending on trait measures of **SWB.** Our manipulation did not produce significant differences on either of our trait-level measures: SHS, F(2, 97) = 0.85, p =.43, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, or life satisfaction, F(2, 98) = 0.02, p = .98, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. The effect size of prosocial spending on the SHS in Study 2b (η_p^2 = .02) was similar in magnitude to that found in Study 2a ($\eta_p^2 = .01$), however, suggesting that the results in Study 2b may not be significant due to our relatively smaller sample size. Moreover, there was an indirect effect of condition on trait levels of happiness via positive affect. Using bootstrapping analyses suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008), we found that the effect sizes for both the SHS and life satisfaction measure were positive and the indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval (CI) did not cross zero: SHS effect size estimate .09, .95% CI [.07, .17], and life satisfaction effect size estimate .25, .95% CI [.02, .48]. Thus, participants experienced more positive affect after reflecting on a past prosocial spending experience, which in turn led them to evaluate their overall well-being and their lives in general more positively.

Discussion

Taken together, Studies 2a and 2b provide evidence that prosocial spending has a causal impact on happiness in both poor and rich countries (Uganda, India, and Canada). This effect emerged even when we controlled for the extent to which the spending experiences served to build or strengthen social relationships, as rated by coders (Study 2a) or participants themselves (Study 2b). Thus, while prosocial spending may enhance well-being in part by fostering social relationships, the benefits of prosocial spending are unlikely to be explained entirely by the well-known link between social relationships and SWB. Of course, asking participants to report the extent to which they had built or strengthened a social relationship may not completely rule out this alternative explanation. It is possible, for example, that participants may not remember the goal of a previous purchase or may fail to report an intention to foster social relationships to avoid acknowledging alternative motivations for generous spending. More broadly, the present studies are limited by their reliance on participants' retrospective accounts of past generous spending behavior.

To build upon the two recollection experiments, we designed Study 3 to fulfill three main aims. First, in Study 3, we examined the effect of actual financial decision making on individuals' in-the-moment affective experience within a controlled context that removed the opportunity for relationship building. Study 3 documented the immediate causal impact of prosocial spending by measuring positive affect after participants were randomly assigned to purchase a "goody bag" for either themselves or a sick child at a local hospital. So that the possibility of relationship building could be ruled out, participants did not interact with the

⁷ Due to the limits of our online survey administration tool, we used quasi-random assignment, based on the day of the month (1st–10th, 11th–20th, 21st–31st) that participants were born; unfortunately, this resulted in uneven cell sizes. Despite uneven cells, the data did not violate the assumption of homogeneity of variance, making our statistical tests robust to Type I error inflation.

recipient of their gift, nor did the researchers or the other participants know whether they had engaged in prosocial or personal spending. As a result, this design allowed us to examine the emotional benefits of what might be considered the purest form of prosocial spending—charitable giving—when spenders could not build social relationships or receive social praise. Second, Study 3 was designed to rule out the possibility that prosocial spending is more enjoyable simply because it more frequently involves purchasing experiences (rather than material goods), an independent predictor of happiness from purchasing (Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). Therefore, all participants in Study 3 were given the opportunity to purchase a material item: a goody bag. Finally, in Study 3, we also extended our findings to a fourth country, South Africa, where per-capita income is relatively low and where the relationship between prosocial spending and happiness was positive (though nonsignificant) in Study 1.

To maximize experimental control, we conducted Study 3 in the laboratory, recruiting a student sample for reasons of feasibility. To confirm that our student samples reflected the broader cultural and economic milieu of their home countries, however, we asked students in Study 3 to complete items from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2009) and Gallup World Poll. We then compared students' responses to the responses provided by nationally representative samples of adults in their home countries.

Study 3

Participants in Canada and South Africa were randomly assigned to buy a goody bag filled with treats for either themselves (personal spending) or a sick child at a local children's hospital (prosocial spending). We assessed participants' happiness before and after this task to investigate whether prosocial spending led to higher levels of happiness than personal spending, even when spending could not build or foster social ties.

Method

Participants. A total of 207 students participated: 86 students from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada $(M_{age} = 21.1 \text{ years}, SD = 4.6; 74\% \text{ females})$ and 121 students from the University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa $(M_{age} = 20.2, SD = 2.1; 54\% \text{ females})$. Participants were reimbursed with course credit (in Canada) or prepaid cell phone minutes (in South Africa); remuneration methods were consistent with local norms for encouraging research participation.

Procedure. Participants were recruited through online participant pools for a group data collection sessions. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were instructed to sit by themselves at a desk without talking to any other participants. They completed a questionnaire assessing their baseline level of happiness on both a state ("Do you feel happy right now?"; from 1, not at all, to 5, extremely) and trait ("In general, I consider myself..."; from 1, not a very happy person, to 7, a very happy person) measure (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). Scores on these two items were highly correlated, r(200) = .43, p < .001, so we standardized and averaged participants' responses to these items as our baseline measure of happiness.

Next, participants read that they had been given additional compensation for their participation in the form of a payment

voucher for \$2.50 in Canada or its equivalent in South Africa, 20 rand. All participants signed a receipt acknowledging their payment and then learned that they could buy a goody bag that had an actual retail value of \$3.00 (or 25 rand) for just \$2.50 (or 20 rand); the stated value of the goody bag exceeded the value of the voucher to encourage participants to make the purchase. Participants randomly assigned to the personal spending condition were informed that they could purchase the goody bag for themselves, whereas participants in the prosocial spending condition were informed that they could purchase the goody bag for a sick child at the nearby children's hospital. Participants in both conditions were given the option of selecting a goody bag with either chocolate, juice or both items, and they completed a "purchase card" indicating whether they wished to buy the goody bag and what they wanted inside of it. Participants in both conditions could also opt out from purchasing a goody bag and redeem the voucher for cash for themselves. The opportunity to opt out of buying a goody bag was offered so that participants in the prosocial spending condition would not feel forced to engage in a generous act; recent research has shown that the emotional benefits of giving are eliminated when people feel forced to give (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). We subtly discouraged participants in both conditions from choosing cash by telling them that it would not be available for pick-up until approximately 2 weeks later.

After noting their choice on the purchase card, participants were directed, one at a time, to a nearby room where they turned in their voucher and purchase card. A second experimenter then directed each participant toward a card labeled with their participant number. The card thanked participants in both conditions and noted that the goody bags would be available for pickup after the study (personal spending) or would be delivered to a sick child at the children's hospital (prosocial spending). Each participant then returned to the first lab room and completed a questionnaire, which included the PANAS ($\alpha = .91$; Watson et al., 1988), the Satisfaction with Life Scale ($\alpha = .81$; SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), demographic questions, and several items from the World Values Survey and Gallup World Poll.

Throughout the procedure, all information regarding condition assignment was provided in written form and remained unknown to fellow participants and the experimenters. Furthermore, because participants in the prosocial spending condition were told that their goody bag would be delivered to an anonymous sick child on their behalf, there was no opportunity to develop a social relationship with the beneficiary. As in Study 2a, all study materials were provided in English and edited by local collaborators to ensure that questions would be comprehensible and interpreted consistently in both countries; again, we *z*-scored responses on the composite baseline measure, the PANAS, and the SWLS within each country prior to pooling the data.

World Values Survey Items. Participants completed 14 items regarding their religious, political, and cultural beliefs from the 2008 World Values Survey. Items were selected by analyzing WVS data from 1981 to 2008 and identifying dimensions along which Canadian and South African adults differed significantly. For example, participants were asked to rate the justifiability of prostitution, abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia (from 1, never justifiable, to 10, always justifiable; Table 2).

Gallup World Poll Food Security Item. To compare students' financial situation with adults in their home countries, we

Table 2
Religious, Cultural, and Political Beliefs Reported by Canadian and South African Students (Study 3) and Nationally Representative Samples (From the World Values Survey, 1981–2008)

		Our data			World Values Sur	vey
Variable	Canada mean (SD)	South Africa mean (SD)	Group difference (p)	Canada mean (SD)	South Africa mean (SD)	Group difference (p)
Religion						_
How important would you say religion is in your life? (1, very important; 4, not at						
all important)	3.06 (0.98)	1.92 (0.99)	<.001	2.15 (1.02)	1.43 (0.75)	<.001
Apart from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services these days? (1, more than once a week; 7,						
never or practically never)	5.38 (1.85)	3.38 (1.90)	<.001	4.92 (2.54)	3.34 (2.34)	<.001
Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion? (Dichotomous:						
yes/no)	65% yes	71% yes	.28	67% yes	91% yes	<.001
How much confidence do you have in the churches? (1, a great deal; 4, none at						
all)	2.98 (0.71)	2.48 (0.88)	<.001	2.26 (0.91)	1.70 (0.89)	<.001
Do you think that the churches in Canada (South Africa) give adequate answers to		2110 (0100)		((, , ,)	21.0 (0.05)	
the moral problems and needs of the individual? (Dichotomous: yes/no)	40% yes	40% yes	.48	49% yes	72% yes	<.001
Do you think that the churches in Canada	40% yes	40% yes	.40	49% yes	12% yes	<.001
(South Africa) give adequate answers to						
the problems of family life?						
(Dichotomous: yes/no)	32% yes	56% yes	<.001	47% yes	75% yes	<.001
Culture One of my main goals in life has been to						
make my parents proud (1, strongly						
agree; 4, strongly disagree)	1.96 (0.78)	1.55 (0.74)	<.001	1.98 (0.71)	1.55 (0.66)	<.001
Justifiable (1, never justifiable; 4, always	-1, 0 (01, 0)	(41, 1)		-13 0 (01.1-)	(0.00)	
justifiable)						
Divorce	6.93 (1.82)	6.33 (2.29)	< .05	6.07 (2.65)	3.89 (2.79)	<.001
Prostitution	4.47 (2.58)	3.72 (2.48)	< .04	3.28 (2.58)	2.26 (2.25)	<.001
Abortion	6.39 (2.64)	4.89 (3.00)	<.001	4.55 (2.94)	2.75 (2.56)	<.001
Homosexuality	7.93 (2.70)	4.82 (3.46)	<.001	5.62 (3.32)	2.68 (2.51)	<.001
Euthanasia	5.32 (2.66)	4.32 (3.13)	< .02	5.46 (3.12)	3.56 (2.94)	<.001
Politics						
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office (1, <i>strongly agree</i> ;						
5, strongly disagree)	4.33 (0.96)	3.70 (1.28)	<.001	3.55 (1.17)	2.57 (1.26)	<.001
It would be better for Canada (South Africa)		` '				
if more people with strong religious						
beliefs held public office (1, strongly						
agree; 5, strongly disagree) Gallup World Poll	4.11 (1.11)	3.26 (1.33)	<.001	3.36 (1.14)	2.29 (1.04)	<.001
Have there been times in the past 12 months						
that you did not have enough money to						
buy food that you or your family						
needed? (Dichotomous: yes/no)	3.6% yes	21.9 % yes	<.001	8.8%	54.4%	<.001

asked participants to complete the Gallup World Poll measure of food security utilized in Study 1 (Table 2).

Results

Seven participants (one in Canada and six in South Africa) who were assigned to the prosocial spending condition opted out of purchasing a goody bag for a sick child and instead requested to receive the cash value of the voucher for themselves. Because these participants chose not to engage in prosocial behavior, they were excluded from analyses. In past experimental research (Dunn et al., 2008, Study 3), we excluded a similar percentage of partic-

ipants who reported not following their spending directions. Excluded participants did not differ from the rest of the sample on baseline happiness. We retained the 28 participants in the personal

⁸ When we included participants in the prosocial spending condition who chose to receive cash for themselves, the main effect of spending condition remained significant, p=.002, and neither the main effect of country nor the Condition \times Country interaction approached significance (Fs<.02, ps<.7). When we excluded all participants in both conditions who chose to receive cash, the main effect of condition was again significant, p=.04, and neither the main effect of country nor the Condition \times Country interaction reached significance (ps>.73).

spending condition who opted out of purchasing a goody bag because they still chose a personal benefit in the form of cash for themselves. The following analyses are similar if we include all participants.⁸

Baseline levels of happiness did not differ between conditions in either country (Fs < 2.5, ps > .12). Therefore, we submitted postspending positive affect ratings to a 2 (spending type: personal vs. prosocial) × 2 (country: South Africa vs. Canada) ANCOVA, controlling for baseline levels of happiness.9 As predicted, there was a significant main effect of spending type, whereby participants randomly assigned to purchase a goody bag for a sick child reported higher positive affect (M = 0.26, SD = 0.98) than participants assigned to buy a goody bag for themselves (M =-0.24, SD = 0.96), F(1, 192) = 10.25, p = .002, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. The interaction of spending type and country was not significant, F(1,192) = 0.01, p = .98, $\eta_p^2 = .000$. Thus, across cultures, participants reported higher levels of positive affect when they were given the opportunity to buy something for another person rather than themselves. Consistent with the results of Study 2b, there was no direct effect of condition on life satisfaction ratings, F(1,(192) = 0.86, p = .36. Because positive affect and life satisfaction ratings were only weakly correlated, r(194) = .17, p < .05, there was also no indirect effect of condition on life satisfaction ratings through positive affect.

We next examined whether the effect of condition on positive affect emerged within Canada and South Africa independently. In the Canadian sample, we conducted an ANCOVA to compare the happiness of participants randomly assigned to the two spending conditions. As expected, participants in the prosocial spending condition reported higher positive affect (M=0.29, SD=1.06) than participants in the personal spending condition (M=-0.27, SD=0.87), F(1,81)=4.53, p=.036, $\eta_p^2=.05$. The same was true in South Africa; participants randomly assigned to purchase a goody bag for a sick child reported higher levels of positive affect (M=0.23, SD=0.93) than participants assigned to the personal spending condition (M=-0.21, SD=1.03), F(1,110)=5.84, p=.02, $\eta_p^2=.05$. Thus, both across and within these two different nations, generous spending led to emotional rewards.

As shown in Table 2, participants in the two countries differed from each other in culturally expected ways; on 13 of the 15 items we included, the student samples differed significantly, and in the same direction as the adult samples in the World Values Survey and Gallup World Poll. For instance, just like adults in the two countries, students in Canada were much more likely than students in South Africa to view homosexuality as justifiable—though students in both samples viewed homosexuality more favorably than did adults in their home countries. Also mirroring results for adults, a significantly higher percentage of South African students reported that they had struggled to acquire food for themselves and their family in the past 12 months compared with Canadian students-though again students in both countries were less likely to report food scarcity than were representative samples of adults. These responses suggest that although student samples differed from nationally representative samples of adults within countries, the students in our samples also reflect important differences between countries.

Discussion

Providing support for our central hypothesis, Study 3 demonstrates that participants in both Canada and South Africa reported higher levels of positive affect after choosing a gift for someone else than after choosing something for themselves. By removing contact with the recipient and ensuring that only the participants knew whether they had engaged in personal or prosocial spending, we addressed the alternative explanation that prosocial spending increases happiness only by strengthening social relationships. Indeed, even when the recipient was unknown to the spender and there was no way for the spender to meet the recipient, prosocial spending led to emotional rewards. It is important to note that the absence of a control condition means that we cannot completely discount the possibility that participants in the personal spending condition experienced a decrease in well-being. However, in light of the results of Study 2b—where prosocial spending made people happier than both personal spending and a control condition, which did not differ from each other—we suggest that it is more likely that prosocial spending has positive emotional consequences.

General Discussion

Taken together, the present studies provide the first evidence for a possible psychological universal: human beings around the world experience emotional rewards from using their financial resources to benefit others. Within the vast majority of the world's countries, we find a positive relationship between prosocial spending and well-being, whereby individuals who have recently made donations to charity report greater satisfaction with their lives, even controlling for differences in income. Focusing on three of these countries-Canada, Uganda, and India-that differ dramatically in national-level income and donation frequency, we find that individuals report significantly greater happiness after reflecting on a time when they spent money on others rather than themselves. Finally, in a controlled lab study conducted in both Canada and South Africa, we find that individuals randomly assigned to buy a gift for someone else report higher levels of happiness than participants assigned to buy a gift for themselves, even when no one else is aware of their kind deed. Thus, although prosocial spending differs in frequency and form in poor versus rich countries, its link to happiness emerges in countries that vary greatly in wealth.

Consistent with past research on important predictors of well-being, including exercise (e.g., Reed & Ones, 2006; Valois, Zullig, Huebner, & Drane, 2004) and social interactions (e.g., McIntyre, Watson, Clark, & Cross, 1991; Mishra, 1992), our research on prosocial spending demonstrates both trait-level effects among people who practice this behavior in daily life and more acute state-level effects among people prompted to engage in this behavior by experimental manipulations. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we also obtained some mixed evidence that our experimental manipulations influenced trait-level measures of SWB. We would expect transient, state-level measures of SWB to be most responsive to our manipulations of prosocial spending, particularly given

⁹ Analyses controlling for each individual measure of baseline happiness separately were substantively the same. The main effect of spending condition was significant (Fs > 9.5, ps < .005), and neither the main effect of country or the Condition \times Country interaction term approach significance (Fs < 1.0, ps > .75).

that previous research on experiential spending has shown emotional benefits at the state level (Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Howell & Hill, 2009; Millar & Thomas, 2009; Nicolao, Irwin, & Goodman, 2009; Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). Indeed, prosocial spending had a larger impact on state measures than on trait measures of SWB across our studies (effect size on state measures: $\eta_p^2 = .07$ and $\eta_p^2 = .05$ in Studies 2b and 3 vs. effect sizes on trait measures ranging from $\eta_p^2 = .00$ to $\eta_p^2 = .02$ in Studies 2a, 2b, and 3). The fact that we were able to detect effects of our experimental manipulations on "trait" measures of SWB such as the SHS likely reflects the fact that even trait-like measures are influenced by current levels of happiness (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, Study 2b). Our ability to detect these small effects on trait measures of SWB may have been underpowered in Studies 2b and 3 because both studies involved relatively lower sample sizes than the other studies; indeed, the effect size of prosocial spending on trait measures of SWB was similar in Studies 2a and 2b (e.g., $\eta_p^2 = .01$ in Study 2a vs. $\eta_p^2 = .02$ in Study 2b), but only significant in the former, which had the larger sample. The constrained nature of prosocial spending we used in Study 3—while essential to show that prosocial spending increases happiness even in the absence of social connection or praise—may also have limited its positive impact, making emotional rewards harder to detect on a trait-level measure.

Limitations

The present research should be viewed as a first step in understanding the relationship between generosity and SWB around the world. One limitation of the current investigation is that we used nationally representative samples only in Study 1. In Study 2a, three quarters of our sample consisted of students. It is worth noting that students in both Canada and Uganda were attending public institutions that attract a diverse student body from both rural and urban areas; in Uganda, a sizeable proportion of students in our sample had their tuition costs covered by the Ugandan government (approximately 25% of our sample), and in Canada, undergraduate education is heavily subsidized by the government. Furthermore, Canadian students reported earning substantially more (an average of \$5,000-\$10,000/year) than Ugandan students (approximately 1,600 Canadian dollars at 2009 purchasing power parity exchange rates), suggesting that income differences between the two countries are manifested even among students. That said, students may differ from community members in a myriad of ways (Sears, 1986), and for this reason, we also recruited a community subsample in Study 2a and a community sample in Study 2b. While our community sample in Study 2b may have not been representative of the adult population, this sampling strategy revealed that the causal impact of prosocial spending on happiness was not limited to students. Only in Study 3 did we rely exclusively on students, and therefore the results of this study should be interpreted with particular caution. At the same time, our data suggest that the student samples in Study 3 were reflective of the cultural and economic contexts of their home countries. Moreover, the emotional benefits of prosocial spending were not moderated by individuals' education, age, or income in the representative samples included in Study 1, suggesting that the relationship between prosocial spending and well-being is not limited to special demographic groups (e.g., students).

Importance of Diverse Samples

Based on research demonstrating that helping others produces happiness among Western participants (e.g., Dunn et al., 2008; Harris, 1977; Williamson & Clark, 1989), it is tempting to simply infer that the warm glow of generosity is fundamental to humans in all cultures (e.g., Post, 2005; Weiss, Buchanan, Altstatt, & Lombardo, 1971). Such inferences are based on the assumption that human beings are essentially cut from the same cloth, such that a phenomenon discovered among Western samples will also be manifested in other cultures. A recent comprehensive review of the literature suggests that this assumption is empirically untenable (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010b). Even seemingly basic psychological processes, from social reasoning to spatial and visual cognition, often differ drastically across cultures. For example, the San foragers of the Kalahari do not exhibit the Muller-Lyer visual illusion—a staple of introductory psychology textbooks-whereas American undergraduates emerge as an outlier, exhibiting this illusion to a far greater extent than people from other cultures. Because the vast majority of psychological research is conducted by studying what Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010b) termed WEIRD (acronym for Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic) people, the current literature often provides a profoundly unrepresentative portrait of human psychology (see also Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a).

To examine whether this major limitation applies to the literature on generosity and happiness, we first reviewed the 14 published studies of which we are aware that have used experimental methodology to document the causal effect of generosity on happiness. Of the five studies that clearly identified the geographic origins of their samples, all reported drawing participants from North America (Dunn et al., 2008; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Harris, 1977; Yuen, Huang, Burik, & Smith, 2008), with one additional study conducted with high-school-age boys in Israel (Yinon & Landau, 1987; Y. Yinon, personal communication, February 21, 2011). In eight other studies, the geographic origins of the samples were not reported, though the researchers were based at North American institutions (Field, Hernandez-Reif, Quintino, Schanberg, & Kuhn, 1998; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010; Williamson & Clark, 1989); the absence of information regarding geographical origins presumably reflects the common assumption that similar results would emerge across different populations. Thus, our review suggests that like most research in social psychology, experimental research on generosity and happiness has disproportionately examined North Americans.

While relatively few studies have used experimental methodology to examine the causal effect of generosity on happiness, many more have examined the association between these variables using other methods. We identified 61 studies in this category (see Table 3 for a summary). One notable study used a worldwide survey to examine the correlation between happiness and volunteer work (Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007). In addition, a handful of studies used samples drawn from unspecified populations or countries such as Israel, China, and Taiwan. Yet, the overwhelming majority—approximately 80% of the studies—focused exclusively upon samples drawn from North America and Europe. Thus, if scholars wish to draw conclusions about the role of generosity in human nature, it is essential to sample far more widely than standard WEIRD samples. By moving beyond such samples, the present

Table 3
Nonexperimental Examinations of the Association Between
Generosity and Happiness

Sample	Study
International Unspecified	Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007 Konow & Early, 2008; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; Melia, 2000; Tang, Choi, & Morrow-Howell, 2010
Other	
China	Law, Shek, & Ma, 2011; Wu, Tang, & Yan, 2005
Israel	Magen, 1996; Magen & Aharoni, 1991; Osterweil & Feingold, 1981
Taiwan	Kao, 2009
North America and Europe	Borgonovi, 2008; D. R. Brown, Gary, Green, & Milburn, 1992; S. L. Brown, Brown, House, & Smith, 2008; Calabrese & Schumer, 1986; Cutler, 1976; Dulin & Hill, 2003; Duncan & Whitney, 1990; Froh, Bono, & Emmons, 2010; Froh, Yurkewicz, & Kashdan, 2009; Greenfield & Marks, 2004; Hainsworth & Barlow, 2001; Hao, 2008; Haski-Leventhal, 2009; Hawley, Little, & Pasupathi, 2002; Hecht & Boies, 2009; Hunter & Linn, 1980–1981; Jirovec & Hyduk, 1998; Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001; Li, 2007; Liang, Krause, & Bennett, 2001; Luks, 1988; McMunn, Nazroo, Wahrendorf, Breeze, & Zaninotto, 2009; Meier & Stutzer, 2008; Mellor et al., 2008; Midlarsky, 1991; Midlarsky & Kahana, 1994; Morrow-Howell, Hinterlong, Rozario, & Tang, 2003; Morrow-Howell, Kinnevy & Mann, 1999; Musick, Herzog, & House, 1999; Musick & Wilson, 2003; Newman, Vasudev, & Onawola, 1985; Piliavin & Siegal, 2007; Pillemer, Fuller-Rowell, Reid, & Wells, 2010; Plagnol & Huppert, 2010; Rietschlin, 1998; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; Schwartz, Meisenhelder, Ma, & Reed, 2003; Schwartz & Sendor, 1999; Taylor & Pancer, 2007; Thoits & Hewitt, 2001; Van Willigen, 2000; Waddell & Jacobs-Lawson, 2010; Wahrendorf, Knesebeck, & Siegrist, 2006; Wallace & Pichler, 2009; Wilson & Musick, 1999; Windsor, Anstey & Rodgers, 2008

research offers a major advance in demonstrating that the emotional benefits of helping others extend to diverse regions of the world.

The Meaning of Universality

While the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB was positive in economically and culturally diverse areas of the world, it also varied in strength in different cultural contexts, consistent with our hypothesis that this relationship represents a functional (as opposed to an accessibility) universal. Indeed, while we did not find statistically significant differences in the prosocial spending—happiness link between Canada and Uganda (Study 2a) or Canada and South Africa (Study 3), a close examination of the effect sizes suggest that the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB is not perfectly uniform; the prosocial spending effect differed across countries when the recollection procedure

was used ($\eta_p^2 = .07$ in India, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ in Canada, and $\eta_p^2 = .01$ in Uganda), but not when participants were asked to engage in an act of prosocial spending in the lab ($\eta_p^2 = .05$ in Canada vs. $\eta_p^2 = .05$ in South Africa). Cultural variability is also visible in Study 1: although the relationship between prosocial spending and SWB was significant in all seven of the world's major regions and emerged in both poor and rich countries, this relationship varied in strength across our sample and failed to reach significance in a nontrivial number of countries.

This complexity highlights a fundamental tension in identifying cultural universals, in that even robust patterns may vary substantially in form or degree of expression across cultures. For example, although recognition of basic emotions is generally considered to be a cultural universal, Ekman et al. (1987) reported substantial cross-cultural variation in the extent to which people could accurately identify basic emotional expressions (e.g., fear was recognized with 91% accuracy in Estonia but with only 65% accuracy in Japan); furthermore, in some samples, a subset of universal emotions was not recognized at statistically significant levels (Ekman, Sorensen, & Friesen, 1969). Therefore, even universal phenomena show a range of strength across cultures and may not be detected in every sample.

Whereas anthropologists have traditionally emphasized "exceptions to the rule" by studying cultures that differ from most others, we echo recent psychological perspectives by emphasizing the value of identifying regularities that emerge across widely divergent cultural contexts, rather than focusing on isolated exceptions (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). That said, it is certainly important to investigate whether the exceptions to the rule we observed can be explained by identifying the cultural conditions that might undermine the widespread relationship between financial generosity and well-being. We hope that the data reported here will facilitate such investigations.

Prosocial Behavior and Happiness

Finally, while we investigated the emotional consequences of spending money on others, prosocial spending represents only one form of generous behavior (Liu & Aaker, 2008). It is therefore possible that other kinds of helpful behaviors—such as volunteering within one's community, caring for the ill, or performing random acts of kindness (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Piliavin & Siegl, 2007; Thoits & Hewitt, 2001)—may also promote wellbeing around the world. This possibility is supported by the research reviewed earlier demonstrating that the rewarding properties of generosity can be detected at a neural level and that even infants often assist others in need. Because neuroimaging data and studies with infants provide suggestive—but inconclusive—evidence for establishing psychological universals (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005), the time is ripe for directly examining whether human beings around the world experience increased happiness after performing a wide range of kind deeds.

In addition, it is worth noting the present research examined whether people spent money on others rather than how much they spent. Specifically, participants in Study 1 were simply asked if they had donated to charity in the last month, and participants in the remaining studies were asked either to recall spending a fixed monetary amount (Studies 2a and 2b) or to purchase a standardized goody bag (Study 3), thereby holding spending amount constant.

This method allowed us to examine the emotional benefits of similar prosocial spending actions across economically diverse populations, but future research should explore whether there is an ideal ratio of personal income that should be invested in others to produce the largest emotional rewards and whether this ratio varies with personal or national wealth.

Future research should also explore whether the emotional benefits of prosocial spending are greatest when directed toward kin and close others. Evolutionary theory suggests that people should prefer to help relatives and allies (Hamilton, 1963; Trivers, 1971), implying that people might derive greater emotional rewards from helping close others rather than strangers or acquaintances. Initial research conducted in North America supports this hypothesis: the emotional benefits of prosocial spending are greater when an individual is giving to those with whom he or she has strong (vs. weak) social ties (Aknin et al., 2011). Further cross-cultural investigation of the role of tie strength in the prosocial spending—happiness link offers yet another important avenue for further research.

Conclusion

From an evolutionary perspective, the emotional rewards that people experience when they help others may serve as a proximate mechanism that evolved to facilitate prosocial behavior, which may have carried short-term costs but long-term benefits for survival over human evolutionary history. The robustness of this mechanism is supported by our finding that people experience emotional benefits from sharing their financial resources with others not only in countries where such resources are plentiful, but also in impoverished countries where scarcity might seem to limit the possibilities to reap the gains from giving to others. Following Norenzayan and Heine's (2005) recommendations for establishing psychological universals, we used a strategy of converging evidence, conducting correlational analyses across a vast array of the world's countries and using experimental methodology within four countries that differ along our key dimension of income. Of course, firmly establishing the universality of a complex psychological phenomenon requires extensive research, ideally conducted by a variety of researchers using diverse methodologies. The studies presented here provide a critical first step. In highlighting the potential universality of emotional benefits stemming from prosocial spending, the present research adds to the chorus of recent interdisciplinary findings documenting the importance of generosity for human well-being.

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Received June 18, 2012
Revision received November 16, 2012
Accepted December 10, 2012

Supplementary Material for Study 1

(Aknin et al: Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal)

version: Aug2011b

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S1 Summary statistics

Table S-1 shows summary statistics for the key variables used in Study 1. The variable dNoSWL is a binary record of whether each individual completed one or two measures of SWB; the life evaluation measure comes either from just the Cantril ladder (dNoSWL=1) or from a mean (dNoSWL=0) of the Cantril ladder and the satisfaction with life question, SWL.

A value of 0 for log(household income) corresponds to the mean reported household income in the U.S.A. The incomes reported in this table are in internationally-comparable (purchasing power parity) units, even though our regressions are carried out at the country level. Small values of log(income) were rounded up to -7 in order to constrain a long tail in this distribution; however, inclusion of an indicator variable for such low income made no substantial difference in the other coefficients. Only one respondent (not from Canada or Uganda) reported an income higher than 3.0 on this (natural) log scale.

The equation estimated separately for each country is of the form

$$SWB_{i} = c_{0} + a \log(Income_{i}) + b Donated_{i} + c Food_{i} + X'_{i}d + g dNoSWL_{i} + \sum_{yr} h_{yr}dWave_{yr} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
(1)

for individual i. The coefficient b represents the relationship between individual life evaluation (SWB_i) and prosocial spending, i.e. the act of donating to charity (Donated_i), controlling for household income (Income_i), reported food inadequacy (Food_i), an indicator dWave_{yr} for each wave (year) of the Gallup World Poll, the remaining demographic variables (X_i) , and the indicator dNoSWL mentioned above.

S2 Detailed estimates

Table S-2 presents the country-by-country ordinary least squares estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for this equation. The grey-shaded rows show regional means of the estimated coefficients. These are calculated using confidence weights from the country-level estimates. All reported coefficients are unstandardized. The estimated coefficients on *donated money* are the primary focus of Study 1.

S2.1 Imperfectly-measured income

We next provide an alternate set of estimates to complement those presented in the main text. A notable concern for interpreting the results of regressions such as those used in Study 1 is that respondents' answers to the donation question may reflect a component of income or wealth that is unmeasured in the self-reported household income question, and that an individual's frequency of monetary donations could primarily reflect the financial ability of the respondent to donate, as opposed to such financial ability being strongly mediated by other aspects of social context that affect the opportunity and decision to donate.

In order to ensure that any income-determined component of the incidence of donating money is correctly captured in the household income coefficient, we replace the *Donated* variable with its income-corrected form, i.e. the residuals μ_i from national-level regressions,

$$(Donated_i) = \alpha \log(Income_i) + \beta dMinIncome_i + \mu_i$$
 (2)

where dMinIncome controls for whether the income measure was below -7. Similarly, we replace *Food* with its income-corrected form. The means of these "net" variables (shown in Table S-1) differ from zero only because they are calculated over the subsample of each country's population which is used in our main result.

Table S-3 shows the estimates using the net-of-income versions of the Donated and Food variables. As expected, the coefficients on household income are highoer, with a country average coefficient of 0.48 rather than 0.39. If we use these coefficients rather than those from Table S-2 to calculate the statistics quoted in the main text, we find that the relationship between prosocial spending and subjective well-being remains positive in all of the 122 out of 136 countries, with this relationship still significant (p < .05) in 66% of these 122 countries. Averaging over all 136 countries, the prosocial spending coefficient $(b = .24, p < 10^{-5})$ is approximately half the coefficient

of log income ($a = 0.48, p < 10^{-5}$). This means that, in this model, donating to charity has a similar relationship to SWB as a 65% increase in income.

While we appeal to the experimental framework of Study 2 to demonstrate causality, we provide the following grounds for reassurance that our findings represent more than a relationship between true material income and life evaluation.

- 1. National-level coefficients on monetary donations are not significantly correlated with national incomes (see main text).
- 2. We include an extra control for material income (the food adequacy response) in order to diminish any income effect on donations, yet this control does not significantly change our estimate for the well-being benefit from donating.
- 3. Adding (removing) our set of demographic controls to (from) the equation leaves the coefficients on donating large and significant.

The country-level mean answer to the donated money question is correlated with national income per capita ($R=0.54,\,p<10^{-4}$). That is, richer countries exhibit more frequent financial donation. The apparent well-being benefits of donating (i.e., the donated money coefficient in Table S-2), on the other hand, are only weakly – and inversely – related to the reported frequency of donations ($R=-0.10,\,p=0.23$).

To summarise, residents of richer countries donate more frequently, but the returns to donating are fairly uniform, i.e. only slightly smaller in the richer countries.

S2.2 Global estimates

Table S-4 shows estimates of global equations which can be compared with the national-level equations estimated in Table S-2 and Table S-3. The dependent variable is the same composite life evaluation used in the main text of Study 1, but in this case all countries are pooled. Each estimate includes a full set of country controls (fixed effects) and a full set of wave (year) controls (fixed effects). Separately including country×wave fixed effects did not change the key coefficients.

The estimated standard errors are clustered at the country level. While the sample is highly international, weights used in the estimate are household weights within each country and have a mean of ~ 1 ; thus each country is represented nearly equally, rather than being reweighted by population. This approach reflects our interest in the diversity of environments around the world, as well as the sampling method used by Gallup.

The first row of Table S-4 shows a stripped-down equation including only income and the Donated variable. The second and third rows bring in the Food variable and the remaining demographic controls, leading to only small shifts in the key coefficients of interest. The coefficient estimates are very similar to those obtained by taking a weighted mean of country-level estimates, shown at the end of Table S-2. Comparing the first and second rows of Table S-4 shows that removing the food inadequacy masure makes little difference but increases slightly the coefficient on donations. This finding supports our conservative approach of controlling for both income and food adequacy in our primary estimates of the well-being effect of donating. The final row makes use of the net-of-income adjusted measures for Donated and Food, again leading to consistent estimates.

Using these globally-estimated coefficients, we find consistency with conclusions based on the means of the national coefficients: for instance, the third row of Table S-4 shows that the prosocial spending coefficient ($b = .27, p < 10^{-5}$) exceeds half the coefficient of log income ($a = 0.41, p < 10^{-5}$)

 10^{-5}). This means that, in this model, donating to charity has a similar relationship to SWB as a 93% increase in income.

For country-level estimates of a similarly detailed equation with more extensive measures of the social context, see *Helliwell et al.* (2010).

S2.3 Regional estimates

Lastly, Table S-5 shows estimates of equations similar to the global estimates but which are pooled according to seven world regions defined by Gallup. Coefficients for each region are estimated for four variations on the model: with and without country-level controls (fixed effects), and with both raw and "net" versions of the Food and Donated variables. The estimated standard errors are clustered at the country level.

In each region, estimates of the prosocial spending coefficient are significant, similar across models, and not statistically different from the means of country-level coefficients reported in the main text and Tables S-2 and S-3.

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	min	max	Obs.	Description
life evaluation	5.3	2.1	0	10	234917	The mean of respondents'
						SWL and "Cantril ladder" re-
						sponses
log(household income)	-2.5	1.55	-7	2.9	234917	Natural logarithm (base e) of
						household income, scaled to
						U.S.A. (PPP in 2003 or 2005)
						value.
not enough money: food (net)	001	.41	-1.17	1.38	234917	Income-orthogonal compo-
						nent of food question
donated money (net, national)	.001	.42	97	1.14	234917	income-orthogonal compo-
						nent of "donated money"
dNoSWL	.65	.48	0	1	239874	Dummy to account for com-
						position of life evaluation
satisfaction with life	5.8	2.5	0	10	85155	See main text
Cantril ladder	5.2	2.2	0	10	234917	See main text
donated money	.30	.46	0	1	234917	Dummy for donated in the
						last month (see main text)
log(US-PPP GDP/capita)	-2.1	1.24	-5.1	.52	234917	Most recent available from
						2003 or 2005

Table S-1: Summary statistics.

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Table S-2: Country-level estimates for life evaluation.

Shaded rows show confidence-weighted means over all countries in a region. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: $0.1\%^{\dagger}$ $1\%^{\star}$ 5% $10\%^{+}$

		$\log(ext{household income})$	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	7MSoND	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(1)	Albania	$.80^{\dagger}$ -	-1.01^{\dagger}	081	086	-1.76	1.29	024	013	18	.26		7.2^{\dagger}	763	.220
		(.11)	(.17)	(.17)	(.14)	(2.5)	(2.7)	(.20)	(.34)	(.17)	(.23)		(.56)		
(2)	Armenia	$.56^{\dagger}$	47^{\dagger}	.15	080	-2.1	.62	32^{+}	55	045	018	1.65	7.6^{\dagger}	858	.212
		(.073)	(.13)	(.22)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(.18)	(.24)	(.19)	(.22)	(1.24)	(.47)		
(3)	Azerbaijan	$oldsymbol{.67}^\dagger$ -	-1.04^\dagger	$.55^{\dagger}$.034	-5.2^{+}	4.5	.12	17	.41	.32	.62	7.9^{\dagger}	802	.248
		(.10)	(.15)	(.15)	(.13)	(2.8)	(3.3)	(.20)	(.35)	(.21)	(.25)	(.45)	(.53)		
(4)	Belarus	$.39^{\dagger}$	99^{\dagger}	$.66^{\dagger}$.019	-3.2^{+}	2.6	037	25	10	.089	55	7.4^{\dagger}	1215	.142
		(.088)	(.12)	(.18)	(.10)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(.17)	(.20)	(.19)	(.21)	(.43)	(.43)		
(5)	Bosnia and	$.60^{\dagger}$	69^{*}	$.68^{\dagger}$.048	-12.5^{\dagger}	11.1^{\dagger}	.30	.17	.16	.43+		8.8^{\dagger}	1538	.162
	Herzegovina	(.096)	(.24)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.4)	(2.5)	(.19)	(.28)	(.16)	(.26)		(.51)		
(6)	Bulgaria	$.51^{\dagger}$	79^{\dagger}	.29+	088	-5.6	4.7+	30	59	.45*	.72*		6.3^{\dagger}	780	.228
(-)		(.11)	(.15)	(.17)	(.14)	(2.5)	(2.4)	(.24)	(.29)	(.16)	(.24)		(.54)		
(7)	Croatia	$.58^{\dagger}$	76^{*}	.34	037	-8.5^{\dagger}	6.8 *	037	29	009	.82 [⋆]		8.8^{\dagger}	803	.163
(2)		(.11)	(.25)	(.16)	(.15)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(.22)	(.33)	(.20)	(.27)		(.56)	1000	122
(8)	Estonia	$oldsymbol{.66^\dagger}$	60^{\dagger}	.33*	034	-5.6^{\dagger}	4.8*	14	070	.005	.28		7.7^{\dagger}	1960	.152
(0)		(.070)	(.11)	(.11)	(.075)	(1.48)	(1.54)	(.12)	(.15)	(.10)	(.13)	+	(.30)	1001	0.40
(9)	Georgia		-1.07^{\dagger}	.093	12	-4.1^{\star}	3.5	.007	29	.11	.040	57^{\dagger}	7.5^{\dagger}	1821	.243
(10)	TT	(.058)	(.090)	(.19)	(.086)	(1.43)	(1.48)	(.11)	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.085)	(.31)	1 4 7 1	105
(10)	Hungary	$.72^{\dagger}$ -	-1.23^{\dagger}	.30	17	-8.0^{\dagger}	7.2^{\dagger}	083	.021	.31	$.82^{\dagger}$	-3.0 *	7.8†	1451	.195

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(\mathrm{age}/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(1.1)		(.12)	(.18)	(.14)	(.12)	(2.0)	(1.95)	(.27)	(.28)	(.16)	(.21)	(1.01)	(.49)		
(11)	Kazakhstan		-1.01^{\dagger}	.080	039	-2.3	1.61	15	44	.36	.48	-1.40^{\dagger}	6.8^{\dagger}	664	.111
(12)	V-morrant on	(.10) .27 [†]	(.18) 80 [†]	.29	.017	(2.8) -5.3^*	(3.0) 4.6 *	.22	.025	.13	.24	.087	(.59) 6.8 [†]	1812	.129
(12)	Kyrgyzstan	(.052)	(.091)	(.14)	(.086)	(1.64)	(1.72)	(.15)	(.19)	(.13)	(.16)	.001 (.97)	(1.04)	1612	.129
(13)	Latvia	.53 [†]	74 [†]	.43 [†]	028	-7.8^{\dagger}	6.6 [†]	.12	.019	.21	.43 [†]	1.51 [†]	5.7 [†]	1944	231
(10)	Lativia	(.065)	(.11)	(.10)	(.073)	(1.46)	(1.56)	(.11)	(.13)	(.096)	(.12)	(.38)	(.48)	1011	.201
(14)	Lithuania		-1.22^{\dagger}	.40	087	-5.4^{\dagger}	4.2*	089	17	.067	.37	-4.0^{\dagger}	. ,	1924	.216
· /		(.068)	(.13)	(.17)	(.083)	(1.41)	(1.40)	(.12)	(.15)	(.12)	(.15)	(.22)	(.34)		
(15)	Montenegro	.15	74	1.33^{\dagger}	.21	-6.6	6.6	.023	14	.96	.91+		5.8^{\dagger}	548	.132
, ,		(.23)	(.31)	(.32)	(.26)	(4.9)	(5.3)	(.32)	(.50)	(.41)	(.48)	•	(1.17)		
(16)	Poland	$.58^{\dagger}$	73^{\dagger}	$.49^{\dagger}$	22	-6.4^{\dagger}	4.8	.018	28	11	.036	.58*	8.9^{\dagger}	1167	.220
		(.084)	(.14)	(.11)	(.11)	(1.93)	(1.92)	(.16)	(.21)	(.15)	(.19)	(.20)	(.38)		
(17)	Republic of	$.38^{\dagger}$	68^{\dagger}	.14	031	-2.6	1.82	14	21	12	.25	62	8.0^{\dagger}	1640	.125
()	Moldova	(.058)	(.10)	(.14)	(.096)	(1.85)	(1.87)	(.17)	(.21)	(.13)	(.17)	(.63)	(.73)		
(18)	Romania	$.54^{\dagger}$	-1.25^{\dagger}	$.76^{\dagger}$	−.36 *	-2.1	1.54	49	85^{\star}	.44	1.00^{\dagger}	−.83 *	7.6^{\dagger}	728	.371
(10)	D : E 1 /:	(.100)	(.14)	$\frac{(.20)}{.36^{+}}$	(.13)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(.24)	(.33)	(.20)	(.26)	(.27)	(.55)	2100	100
(19)	Russian Federation	.52†	85 [†]		091	-6.8^{\dagger}	5.3 [†]	022	037	.12	.41*	.38	7.3 [†]	3180	.189
(20)	Serbia	(.053) .85 [†]	(.087) - .63 *	.20	$\frac{(.073)}{093}$	(1.36) -5.8	(1.44) 6.0	27	(.14) 49 ⁺	$\frac{(.14)}{.28^{+}}$.37	(1.02)	(1.05) 7.7 [†]	1267	.196
(20)	DeiDia	(.11)	(.20)	(.19)	(.13)	-3.8 (2.8)	(2.9)	(.22)	(.29)	(.17)	(.29)		(.57)	1401	.130
(21)	Slovakia		-1.07^{\dagger}	.11	050	. ,	10.7 [†]	.67 [†]	.70*	.25	.47+		8.8 [†]	818	.220
()	2				.000					0	.7'	O 1.	nued e		

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	QNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.14)	(.22)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(.20)	(.27)	(.18)	(.25)		(.48)		
(22)	Slovenia		-1.09^{\dagger}	.40	036		14.9^{\dagger}	.33	.049	$.67^{\dagger}$	1.04^{\dagger}		9.7^{\dagger}	858	.262
(22)		(.13)	(.32)	(.16)	(.15)	(2.8)	(3.0)	(.25)	(.32)	(.19)	(.25)	10	(.49)	0.0=	
(23)	Tajikistan	$.60^{\dagger}$	75^{\dagger}	.18	.16	75	099	071	.038	062	.16	42	7.7^{\dagger}	867	.262
(0.4)	TT1 '	(.057)	(.11)	(.12)	(.11)	(1.55)	(1.59)	(.16)	(.25)	(.14)	(.21)	(.33)	(.34)	0100	1.40
(24)	Ukraine	.39†	−.48 [†]	.41+	.034	1.04	-2.9	52 [⋆]	56*	.035	.51*	−.50 [†]	6.8†	2102	.140
(25)	Uzbekistan	(.091) .26 [†]	(.11)	.13	(.10)	(2.1) -7.4^{\dagger}	(2.2) 8.5 [†]	(.17)	(.21)	(.18)	(.19)	(.14)	(.43)	1720	.095
(25)	Uzbekistan		69 [†]		19			.25	28	.48†	.44	.27	6.8†	1720	.095
(1-25)	FSU and E Europe	(.058) .50 [†]	(.093) 83 [†]	(.12) .33 [†] -	(.095) 059*	(1.99) -5.4^{\dagger}	(2.2) 4.4 [†]	(.17) 018	(.25) 16 [†]	(.13) .14 [†]	(.19) .37 [†]	(.47) 64 [†]	(.62) 8.0 [†]	33230	
(1-20)	rso and E Europe	(.016)	(.026)	(.030)	(.021)	(.39)	(.40)	(.033)	(.043)	(.031)	(.039)	(.058)	(.095)	33230	
(26)	Austria	.20+	.034	.47*	13	-9.1^{\dagger}	8.4*	.53	$\frac{(.043)}{29}$.57	.66	76 [†]	8.6 [†]	624	.087
(20)	Husuna	(.12)	(.34)	(.17)	(.15)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(.21)	(.30)	(.40)	(.44)	(.22)	(.68)	024	.001
(27)	Belgium	.19	−.76 *	.19+	16	-3.5^{+}	3.3+	.40+	007	.97	1.14	(.22)	6.9 [†]	513	.119
()	201814111	(.12)	(.25)	(.11)	(.12)	(1.97)	(1.89)	(.21)	(.30)	(.43)	(.46)		(.60)	010	.110
(28)	Cyprus	` /	-1.35^{\dagger}	.35	27 ⁺	-4.2^{+}	4.7+	.17	041	.52	.70		6.9^{\dagger}	810	.122
` /	V I	(.13)	(.40)	(.15)	(.15)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(.23)	(.31)	(.25)	(.30)	<u>.</u>	(.58)		
(29)	Denmark	.096 -	-1.21^{+}	.25	069	-3.7	4.1	$.61^{\dagger}$	086	.16	.004	-2.4	8.1^{\dagger}	820	.090
, ,		(.068)	(.64)	(.11)	(.095)	(1.71)	(1.71)	(.18)	(.23)	(.30)	(.32)	(.95)	(.52)		
(30)	Finland	.40*	87 [⋆]	.25*	20	-5.1^{\star}	4.7	.18	12	12	13		9.4^{\dagger}	760	.144
		(.12)	(.30)	(.096)	(.099)	(1.82)	(1.85)	(.16)	(.18)	(.23)	(.25)		(.52)		
(31)	France	.31	86^{\star}	030	30	-6.6^{\dagger}	5.6^{\star}	.53*	.048	36	17 <mark>-</mark>	-1.81^{\dagger}	9.1^{\dagger}		.113
												Conti	nued c	n next	nage

		$\log(ext{household income})$	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$({ m age}/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	NoswL	constant	obs.	$R^2({ m adj})$
		(.13)	(.32)	(.14)	(.13)	(1.69)	(1.78)	(.16)	(.25)	(.29)	(.31)	(.23)	(.45)		
(32)	Germany	.44*	-1.37^{\dagger}	.38*	19 -	-11.8^{\dagger}	10.5^{\dagger}	.28	035	.26+	.54*	90	9.5^{\dagger}	670	.165
		(.14)	(.32)	(.15)	(.13)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(.18)	(.23)	(.16)	(.20)	(1.38)	(.49)		
(33)	Iceland	.39*	-1.64^\dagger	$.64^{\dagger}$	10 -	-13.8^{\dagger}	12.7^{\dagger}	$.95^{\dagger}$	096	11	.16		9.8^{\dagger}	409	.256
		(.13)	(.33)	(.19)	(.17)	(3.0)	(3.3)	(.25)	(.43)	(.21)	(.22)		(.52)		
(34)	Ireland	.085	87 [⋆]	.002	.087	-1.86	2.6	.26	43^{+}	34	42		8.3^{\dagger}	694	.065
		(.086)	(.27)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.2)	(2.2)	(.17)	(.25)	(.25)	(.26)		(.56)		
(35)	Italy	.18	-1.07^{\dagger}	.21	041	-2.6	1.54	.37	.057	.33	.61	1.20	7.3^{\dagger}	507	.096
		(.12)	(.28)	(.21)	(.25)	(2.7)	(3.2)	(.26)	(.38)	(.49)	(.55)	(.56)	(.60)		
(36)	Kosovo	$.63^{\dagger}$	51^{\dagger}	$.74^{\dagger}$	15	-4.3	3.0	.19		054	.11		7.6^{\dagger}	1793	.168
(2-)		(.085)	(.14)	(.10)	(.10)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.32)	(.12)	(.20)		(.43)		
(37)	Luxembourg	.25	97	.32	35^{+}	2.5	-2.5	.20	034	39	17		6.8^{\dagger}	255	.074
(20)	M 1 '	(.33)	(.82)	(.22)	(.19)	(4.5)	(4.3)	(.31)	(.33)	(.32) .33 ⁺	(.40)		(1.04)	014	1.00
(38)	Macedonia	.78†	24	.13	24 -		14.6 [†]	.12	13		.61		9.4	914	.160
(39)	Malta	.27	(.24) - 1.60 [†]	(.16) 29	(.16) 88*	$\frac{(3.0)}{-3.6}$	$\frac{(3.0)}{3.9}$.090	$(.41)$ -1.23^{+}	.066	.34	.075	(.61) 8.3 [†]	204	.189
(39)	Mana													204	.169
(40)	Netherlands	(.18) .30 [†]	(.40) 80	.002	.021	(4.5) - 4.1 *	(4.7) 4.2 *	(.37) •41*	.28	.013	.033	(1.07)	(.98) 8.4 [†]	831	.095
(40)	remenands	(.073)	(.36)	(.11)	(.091)	(1.53)	(1.53)	(.14)	(.19)	(.10)	(.11)		(.33)	091	.030
(41)	Norway	.004	-1.22^{\dagger}	.044	11	$\frac{(1.33)}{-2.6}$	3.0	.66 [†]	.054	$\frac{(.10)}{13}$.036	-2.6^{\dagger}	8.0 [†]	817	.105
(11)	1.01 11 41	(.045)	(.33)	(.11)	(.10)	(1.97)	(1.95)	(.17)	(.21)	(.16)	(.16)	(.65)	(.41)	Ü.,	.100
(42)	Portugal	. ,	-1.05^{\dagger}	.72	.079	_8.1 [*]	5.9	096	15	.077	.29 -	-1.70^{\dagger}	9.8	1284	.230
\ /					-						- <u>-</u>			n nevt	

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.11)	(.24)	(.17)	(.13)	(2.6)	(2.4)	(.24)	(.31)	(.17)	(.22)	(.26)	(.60)		
(43)	Spain	.28*	83	11	045	-6.3	6.2+	.59	.38	.63*	.53	.10	8.3^{\dagger}	564	.080
())	~ -	(.10)	(.40)	(.17)	(.16)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(.28)	(.36)	(.23)	(.25)	(.50)	(.64)		
(44)	Sweden		-1.17^{\dagger}	.23+	097	-4.1	4.6^{\star}	$.59^{\dagger}$.25	.12	.23	-2.9	7.9^{\dagger}	833	.134
(15)		(.11)	(.29)	(.12)	(.12)	(1.84)	(1.78)	(.17)	(.22)	(.16)	(.16)	(1.30)	(.46)		
(45)	Switzerland	$.69^{\dagger}$	91^{\dagger}	.24	16	-4.2^{+}	5.5	064	40^{+}	.10	.24		8.3^{\dagger}	817	.116
(40)	m 1	(.10)	(.27)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(.17)	(.24)	(.21)	(.24)		(.44)	001	404
(46)	Turkey	.40*	-1.15^{\dagger}	054	30^{+}	-7.7	7.5	.55	28	.099	94		7.9^{\dagger}	864	.101
(45)	TT ** 1 TZ* 1	(.13)	(.17)	(.24)	(.18)	(3.0)	(3.3)	(.23)	(.50)	(.19)	(.40)		(.60)	1504	100
(47)	United Kingdom	.27†	92^{\dagger}	.48†	20	-3.8	5.0*	.23+	26	.41	.61		6.8†	1524	.120
(26-47)	European	(.057) .26 [†]	(.18) 88 [†]	(.12) .27 [†]	(.094) 13 [†]	(1.72) -5.3^{\dagger}	(1.78) 5.2^{\dagger}	(.12) .35 [†]	$\frac{(.16)}{068}$	(.49) .077 ⁺	(.49) .16*	-1.23^{\dagger}	(.60) 8.3 [†]	17308	
(20-47)	European Countries	(.020)	(.057)	(.029)	(.027)		(.47)	(.041)	008 (.056)	(.043)	(.050)	(.12)	(.11)	17308	
(48)	Australia		-1.19^{\dagger}	.42 [†]	$\frac{(.027)}{19^{+}}$	$(.47)$ -4.7^{+}	6.0	041	$\frac{(.056)}{51}$.053	033	(.12)	7.9 [†]	1024	.165
(40)	Tustiana	(.11)	(.23)	(.11)	(.10)	(2.7)	(3.0)	(.15)	(.23)	(.41)	(.42)		(.63)	1024	.100
(49)	Canada	. ,	-1.13^{\dagger}	.27*	39 [†]	-8.7^{\dagger}	9.3	.41*	25	.012	.14		9.1 [†]	1994	.151
(10)	Callada	(.074)	(.28)	(.11)	(.090)	(1.71)	(1.78)	(.13)	(.18)	(.19)	(.19)		(.36)	1001	.101
(50)	New Zealand	.25	91 [†]	.27	47^{\dagger}	-5.9 [⋆]	6.4 *	.20	080	18	054	10	9.0	612	.096
()		(.12)	(.25)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(.21)	(.29)	(.15)	(.14)	(.21)	(.44)		
(51)	United States of		-1.31^{\dagger}	.23+	14	-9.7^{\dagger}	10.2^{\dagger}	.62 [†]	.17	.24	.15	37^{\dagger}	9.1^{\dagger}	1872	.164
	America	(.074)	(.27)	(.12)	(.11)	(1.68)	(1.63)	(.18)	(.22)	(.47)	(.48)	(.10)	(.53)		
$\langle 48\text{-}51 \rangle$		$.29^{\dagger}$ -	-1.13^{\dagger}	$.30^{\dagger}$	29^{\dagger}	-7.9^{\dagger}	8.7^{\dagger}	$.29^{\dagger}$	19^{+}	071	.022	32^{\dagger}	8.9^{\dagger}	5502	
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	USA, Canada,	log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
	Aus., and NZ	(.044)	(.13)	(.059)	(.053)	(.97)	(.99)	(.080)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.091)	(.23)		
$\overline{(52)}$	Argentina	064	−.78 *	.20	43	-6.2^{+}	5.0 ⁺	16	24	.84*	1.56^{\dagger}		7.3^{\dagger}	773	.126
		(.11)	(.24)	(.24)	(.19)	(3.2)	(3.0)	(.29)	(.39)	(.27)	(.39)		(.72)		
(53)	Belize	.050	051	.58*	098	-3.5	3.5	.45	40	.49	1.18	.39	6.7^{\dagger}	267	.108
		(.16)	(.22)	(.21)	(.18)	(4.7)	(6.2)	(.22)	(.39)	(.19)	(.49)	(1.77)	(.86)		
(54)	Bolivia	$.47^{\dagger}$	48^{\dagger}	.21	11	-5.1^*	5.0 *	20	23	.24	.48*		7.9^{\dagger}	1649	.113
		(.064)	(.10)	(.13)	(.095)	(1.72)	(1.93)	(.13)	(.23)	(.12)	(.18)		(.36)		
(55)	Chile	$.60^{\dagger}$	98^{\dagger}	.064	094	-3.1	2.4	026	10	$.54^{\dagger}$.60*	75^{\dagger}	8.2^{\dagger}	1893	.215
		(.082)	(.15)	(.12)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(.16)	(.23)	(.15)	(.21)	(.18)	(.49)		
(56)	Colombia	$.35^{\dagger}$	75^{\dagger}	.29*	100	-6.9^{\dagger}	6.8^{\dagger}	073	31	$.45^{\dagger}$	$.75^{\dagger}$		13.2^{\dagger}	2559	.129
722	G	(.068)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(1.61)	(1.77)	(.12)	(.19)	(.13)	(.17)	(.42)	(.59)		
(57)	Costa Rica	.27*	99^{\dagger}	.14	056	-3.7^{+}	3.4	10	26	.11	.17	-1.43	9.6^{\dagger}	664	.135
<u>(F0)</u>	D ' '	(.087)	(.16)	(.12)	(.12)	(1.94)	(2.1)	(.15)	(.27)	(.14)	(.20)	(1.03)	(.42)	1.005	100
(58)	Dominican	$.43^{\dagger}$	93^{\dagger}	.32+	40*	-12.9^{\dagger}	12.9^{\dagger}	14	32	.46	1.04^{\dagger}		9.0^{\dagger}	1625	.129
<u>(FO)</u>	Republic	(.092)	(.17)	(.18)	(.16)	(2.4)	(2.6)	(.20)	(.25)	(.19)	(.21)		(.56)	1071	-004
(59)	Ecuador	.77 [†]	45^{\dagger}	.13	.025	-3.1	2.2	.013	11	.34*	.63†		7.7 [†]	1951	.224
(60)	El Salvador	(.054)	(.093)	(.10) .38 [†]	(.085)	(1.44)	$\frac{(1.55)}{2.1}$	$\frac{(.12)}{094}$	(.18)	(.11) .47 [†]	(.16) .50*	G A	(.33)	2432	.152
(60)	LI Salvador	.44	61 [†]		27*	-2.9	(1.43)		.004			64	8.1 [†]	2432	.102
(61)	Guatemala	(.061) .38 [†]	(.085) 37	.14	.018	(1.31) -4.7	$\frac{(1.43)}{4.0^{+}}$.052	19	.28 ⁺	.30	(.81)	(.88) 8.3 [†]	1287	.065
(01)	Guatemaia	(.082)	(.16)	(.12)		-	(2.2)			(.15)	(.23)		(.46)	1401	.000
(62)	Guyana	.21	$\frac{81}{}$.43	(.13) 71 *	$\frac{(2.0)}{2.2}$	-2.9	$(.16)$ 57^{+}	$\frac{(.28)}{95}$	23	.81*	-1.42^{+}	7.2 [†]	209	.107
(02)	Gayana	.41	.01	.10	., _	2.2	2.3	.01	.00	.20	.01	-		n nevt	

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.19)	(.36)	(.27)	(.25)	(4.5)	(5.1)	(.31)	(.47)	(.31)	(.31)	(.81)	(1.03)		
(63)	Haiti	14^{+}	.009	077	.11	2.3	-1.96	.35+	23	$.59^{\dagger}$	1.05^{\dagger}		2.3^{\dagger}	722	.032
		(.082)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(3.1)	(3.7)	(.20)	(.29)	(.17)	(.29)		(.61)		
(64)	Honduras		-1.05^{\dagger}	.23+	28	-3.9^{+}	3.2	13	32	.48*	.88*	-1.07	8.8^{\dagger}	1535	.149
		(.079)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(.16)	(.28)	(.16)	(.29)	(.53)	(.74)		
(65)	Mexico	$.49^{\dagger}$	81^{\dagger}	.32*	36^{\dagger}	-1.44	031	045	.12	.24	.41	1.65^{+}	6.7^{\dagger}	1691	.209
		(.067)	(.12)	(.12)	(.097)	(1.83)	(2.1)	(.13)	(.22)	(.12)	(.17)	(.84)	(.92)		
(66)	Nicaragua	$.65^{\dagger}$	73^{\dagger}	.031	43^{\dagger}	-6.2^{\star}	6.0^{\star}	29	59	$.46^{\dagger}$.45	<i>−.76</i>	9.5^{\dagger}	1828	.197
(0=)		(.068)	(.11)	(.12)	(.11)	(1.92)	(2.3)	(.13)	(.25)	(.14)	(.19)	(.30)	(.39)		
(67)	Panama	$.44^{\dagger}$	83^{\dagger}	$.45^{\dagger}$	053	2.8	-4.1	15	.17	.49*	.35	73	7.6^{\dagger}	785	.164
(00)		(.088)	(.13)	(.12)	(.12)	(1.86)	(2.0)	(.15)	(.24)	(.18)	(.24)	(.75)	(.48)	2222	
(68)	Paraguay	$.36^{\dagger}$	82^{\dagger}	.25*	010	-7.8^{\dagger}	6.2^{\dagger}	042	.057			22	8.1^{\dagger}	2336	.221
(00)	D	(.048)	(.10)	(.095)	(.092)	(1.36)	(1.42)	(.12)	(.18)	1.0	1.0	(.13)	(.30)	0000	179
(69)	Peru	.57 [†]	45^{\dagger}	.28	12	-6.8^{\dagger}	6.0*	29	17	.16	.46		10.5^{\dagger}	2629	.173
(70)	Puerto Rico	(.068)	(.10) - 1.24 [†]	.47+	(.099)	(1.71) -5.5	(1.92)	(.13) 24	075	(.15)	(.19) 1.53 *	(.26)	(.46)	440	101
(70)	Puerto Rico			•	48^{+}		6.3			1.33 [†]			7.1 [†]	440	.101
(71)	Trinidad and	(.18) .56 [†]	(.32) 78 [†] -	$\frac{(.28)}{37^{+}}$	$\frac{(.28)}{14}$	$\frac{(4.1)}{-5.6^{+}}$	$\frac{(4.1)}{5.1}$.21	.097	.14	$\frac{(.50)}{18}$		(.92) 7.7 [†]	574	.129
(11)	Tobago		(.23)	(.22)	(.21)	-3.0 (3.4)	(3.9)	(.26)	(.39)	(.26)				314	.129
(72)	Uruguay	(.15) .15	87 [†]	$\frac{(.22)}{.29^{+}}$.017	$\frac{-4.6}{}$	$\frac{(3.9)}{3.6^{+}}$.15	$\frac{(.39)}{40}$.16	.67 ⁺ -	-1.08^{*}	(.67) 7.8 [†]	622	.125
(12)	Oruguay	(.11)	(.17)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(.20)	(.26)	(.17)	(.37)	(.39)	(.57)	022	.120
(73)	Venezuela	.19 [†]	56 [†]	$\frac{(.10)}{043}$	13	-3.3^{+}	$\frac{(2.1)}{3.5^{+}}$.15	$\frac{(.20)}{008}$.17	.59*	(.99)	7.7 [†]	1558	.055
(10)	, onone	•=0	.00	.0.10	.10	0.0	3.0	.10	••••		•00	Conti		n next	

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.047)	(.15)	(.16)	(.12)	(1.98)	(2.1)	(.15)	(.24)	(.17)	(.23)		(.43)		
$\langle 52 - 73 \rangle$	Latin America and	$.40^\dagger$	66^{\dagger}	$.21^{\dagger}$	15^{\dagger}	-4.4^{\dagger}	3.7^\dagger -	066*	15^{\star}	$.36^{\dagger}$	$.58^{\dagger}$	93^{\dagger}	8.3^{\dagger}	30029	
(= 4)	Caribbean	(.016)	(.029)	(.029)	(.025)	(.42)	(.46)	(.033)	(.052)	(.033)	(.049)	(.086)	(.11)		440
(74)	Afghanistan	.27*	20	$.64^{\dagger}$	086	5.1	-6.9	29	39	.53*	.89*	48	4.4^{\dagger}	905	.113
(==)	D 1 1 1	(.081)	(.12)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.5)	(3.1)	(.18)	(.29)	(.16)	(.29)	(.44)	(.50)	24.00	100
(75)	Bangladesh	$.61^{\dagger}$	57^{\dagger}	.17	36^{\dagger}	-3.9^{\star}	4.6^{\star}	.082	23	.18	022	$.53^{\dagger}$	6.9^{\dagger}	3188	.162
(50)	Q 1 1:	(.055)	(.084)	(.078)	(.071)	(1.33)	(1.40)	(.12)	(.24)	(.079)	(.18)	(.10)	(.32)	1 ==1	111
(76)	Cambodia	$.23^{\dagger}$	67^{\dagger}	$.38^{\dagger}$	078	2.5	-2.8	27	66^{\dagger}	.036	.24		5.4^{\dagger}	1771	.144
(77)	C1:	(.040)	(.082)	(.084)	(.080)	(2.2)	(2.7)	(.13)	(.18)	(.087)	(.18)		(.39)	0050	107
(77)	China	.51†	−.65 [†]	.26	002	-4.9*	6.2 [†]			.15	.35		7.1	3253	.137
(70)	TT T/	(.046)	(.13) - 1.16 [†]	.17	(.080)	(1.57)	(1.71)	11	22	(.093)	(.15)		(.36)	1161	.230
(78)	Hong Kong				046	-12.6^{\dagger}	13.2 [†]	.41	.33	.40	.66*		7.9 [†]	1101	.230
(79)	India	(.080) .64 [†]	(.24) 43 [†]	(.12) .29*	$\frac{(.11)}{14^{+}}$	$\frac{(2.5)}{-2.7}$	$\frac{(2.9)}{3.4}$	(.20)	(.34) 33	(.18) .29 [†]	(.23) .40*	79^{\dagger}	(.46) 8.6 [†]	4437	.180
(19)	maia				•			.067						4457	.100
(80)	Indonesia	(.069) .40 [†]	(.11) 56 [†]	(.088) .19*	$\frac{(.084)}{089}$	$\frac{(1.85)}{073}$	$\frac{(2.2)}{23}$	(.11) 17	(.32)	.026	(.13)	(.19) - 1.04 [†]	(.41) 7.4 [†]	2952	.128
(00)	muonesia	(.047)		(.066)		073 (1.15)			42		•			2902	.120
(81)	Japan	. ,	$(.075)$ -1.14^{\dagger}	.22*	$(.066)$ 42^{\dagger}	-3.6	(1.25) 3.6	(.10) .38*	.19	(.074)	(.18) .46* -	(.27) - 1.06 [†]	(.35) 7.8 [†]	2924	149
(01)	Japan	(.074)	(.21)	(.085)	(.079)	-3.0 (1.77)	(1.79)	(.12)	(.19)	(.15)	(.16)	(.17)	(.41)	2924	.142
(82)	Lao People's D.R.	.13*	37^{\dagger}	.056	16*	.47	$\frac{(1.73)}{55}$	088	67 [†]	.077	.21+	82 [†]	6.3 [†]	1826	.157
(02)	Lac I copie s D.It.	(.039)	(.078)	(.066)	(.060)	(1.36)	(1.61)	(.092)	(.17)	(.069)	(.11)	(.10)	(.29)	1020	.101
(83)	Malaysia	.21*	86 [†]	.24*	13	-1.74	3.4	$\frac{(.032)}{24}$	24	.26		- 1.64 *	6.9 [†]	1507	.105
(- =)	 J				0		5.1		1	.,				n next	

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.068)	(.22)	(.091)	(.088)	(1.84)	(2.2)	(.12)	(.33)	(.10)	(.14)	(.51)	(.34)		
(84)	Mongolia	$.40^{\dagger}$	82^{\dagger}	.18	19^{+}	-7.7^{\dagger}	8.8^{\dagger}	.38	.080	.092	.19		7.1^{\dagger}	878	.166
		(.093)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(.19)	(.27)	(.15)	(.16)		(.49)		
(85)	Nepal	$.59^{\dagger}$	83^{\dagger}	.15+	43^{\dagger}	.30	.23	39^{\star}	48	.31*	.67	1.73^{\dagger}	5.2^{\dagger}	1843	.230
(2.2)		(.075)	(.14)	(.081)	(.085)	(1.51)	(1.67)	(.13)	(.21)	(.10)	(.30)	(.11)	(.48)		
(86)	Pakistan		-1.12^{\dagger}	.38*	39^{\star}	-7.0^{*}	7.2 *	.12	59	.42*	.65	29	8.6^{\dagger}	2502	.183
(0.5)	DI III	(.086)	(.14)	(.12)	(.12)	(2.3)	(2.6)	(.19)	(.39)	(.15)	(.26)	(.15)	(.47)	1000	
(87)	Philippines	$.38^{\dagger}$	28	.008	11	-7.5^{\dagger}	7.8 *	32	39	.18	.30+	.15	7.4^{\dagger}	1629	.105
(00)	D 111 6.17	(.085)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(.15)	(.26)	(.16)	(.17)	(.52)	(.70)	1	404
(88)	Republic of Korea	$.45^{\dagger}$	70	.33+	−.49 *	-9.7^{\star}	8.0	.70†	.53	.24	.86		7.6^{\dagger}	1770	.181
(00)	a.	(.11)	(.28)	(.17)	(.16)	(3.4)	(3.7)	(.21)	(.59)	(.32)	(.34)	000	(.70)	2105	105
(89)	Singapore	.41	-1.25^{\dagger}	.021	093	-1.09	1.58	066	25	.16	.34*	089	6.9 [†]	2105	.105
(00)	O · T 1	(.059)	(.15)	(.080)	(.073)	(1.75)	(1.92)	(.13)	(.39)	(.10)	(.12)	(.087)	(.33)	1040	1.47
(90)	Sri Lanka	.58†	40^{\dagger}	.061	43 [†]	61	1.49	067	92 [†]	.25	.35	-1.41	6.8†	1848	.147
(91)	Taiwan	(.075) .82 [†]	(.099) - .69 *	(.100) .57 [†]	(.099)	(1.96) -12.7^{\dagger}	(2.1) 13.1 [†]	33	$\frac{(.27)}{17}$	(.098)	.42	(.86)	(.37) 8.9 [†]	776	.211
(91)	Taiwan				42 -									110	.211
(92)	Thailand	(.12)	(.24) 46*	.28+	20	$\frac{(2.9)}{-3.9}$	$\frac{(2.9)}{2.7}$.061	.18	$\frac{(.28)}{19}$	$\frac{(.30)}{.57^{+}}$		(.60) 7.0 [†]	987	.053
(94)	ı nananu	(.084)							(.35)				(.68)	901	.000
(93)	Viet Nam	.24 [†]	(.17) 67 [†]	(.16) .26 [†]	(.14) 10	.94	(3.5) 43	19	.049	(.18) .53 [†]	(.31) .77 [†]		5.6 [†]	1610	.160
(30)	VIOU I VAIII	(.054)	(.10)	(.080)	(.079)	(1.73)	(1.75)	(.14)	(.25)	(.092)	(.12)		(.39)	1010	.100
$\langle 74-93 \rangle$.39 [†]	60^{\dagger}	.20 [†]	19^{\dagger}	-2.5^{\dagger}	2.9 [†]	047	32^{\dagger}	.19 [†]	.37 [†]	.011	6.9^{\dagger}	39872	
\1100/					•10			.011		,10				n next	nage

	Asia	log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.014)	(.026)	(.021)	(.020)	(.41)	(.45)	(.032)	(.058)	(.024)	(.038)	(.043)	(.092)		
(94)	Algeria	$.47^{\dagger}$	-1.03^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$	39^{\dagger}	-5.0	6.3	.15	53^{+}			74	7.5^{\dagger}	1054	.176
(0.5)		(.087)	(.14)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.5)	(3.0)	(.15)	(.32)			(.84)	(.49)		
(95)	Angola	.15	31	.39	.35	055	95				-1.26^{\dagger}	48	4.5^{\dagger}	417	.045
(0.0)	D :	(.17)	(.26)	(.25)	(.25)	(5.0)	(6.2)	0000	0.4.4	(.23)	(.31)	(.75)	(1.04)	1050	
(96)	Benin	.16	58^{\dagger}	.60 [†]	.15	.39	69	0008	.044	$.56^{\dagger}$.30	.41	3.6^{\dagger}	1279	.080
(07)	D /	(.068)	(.11)	(.14)	(.11)	(1.97)	(2.3)	.22	(.22)	(.13)	(.37)	(.17)	(.56)	<u></u>	000
(97)	Botswana		-1.00^{\dagger}	.70*	.13	-1.67	62		.46	40^{+}	.064	4.3†	7.2 [†]	634	.286
(98)	Burkina Faso	(.11) .39 [†]	(.20) 57 [†]	.28	(.19) 066	(2.6) -5.4^*	(2.8) 6.4 *	(.25) .32	.10	(.23)	(.38) .97*	(.30) 84 [†]	(.60) 6.4 [†]	721	.166
(98)	Durkina raso	(.062)		(.24)				(.16)	(.29)	(.13)		(.16)	(.44)	121	.100
(99)	Burundi	.45 [†]	(.12) 80 [†]	.098	.11	$\frac{(2.0)}{-1.54}$.81	.008	.036	13	$(.37)$ -4.5^{\dagger}	013	6.2 [†]	840	.144
(33)	Darana	(.064)	(.14)	(.20)	(.12)	(1.95)	(1.97)	(.20)	(.31)	(.19)	(.21)	(.52)	(.44)	040	.144
(100)	Cameroon	.37	80 [†]	.24	028	-4.1	3.4+	026	33^{+}	$\frac{(.13)}{040}$	31	(.02)	6.6 [†]	2559	.158
(100)	Cameroon	(.046)	(.079)	(.10)	(.078)	(1.65)	(1.92)	(.097)	(.18)	(.085)	(.29)		(.38)	2000	.100
(101)	Central African	.72	37	44*	7e-05	-5.2	7.8	.099	.14	.43 [†]	.84+		8.4^{\dagger}	879	.192
(-)	Republic	(.079)	(.15)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.6)	(3.5)	(.14)	(.25)	(.13)	(.44)		(.59)		
(102)	Chad	$.44^{\dagger}$	39^{\dagger}	$.43^{\dagger}$.12	2.2+	-2.7^{+}	0010	17	.052	.23		4.6^{\dagger}	2582	.223
, ,		(.047)	(.084)	(.11)	(.090)	(1.35)	(1.53)	(.13)	(.20)	(.083)	(.18)	•	(.32)		
$\overline{(103)}$	Congo	1.26^{\dagger}	18	$.82^{\dagger}$.084	34	.34	.21	.66	055	25		8.2^{\dagger}	863	.318
		(.096)	(.16)	(.21)	(.14)	(3.2)	(4.5)	(.18)	(.32)	(.16)	(.34)		(.56)		
(104)	D.R. of the Congo	$.30^{\dagger}$	43^{\dagger}	12	11	.63	-1.14	006	.055	.072	$.70^{\dagger}$		6.0^{\dagger}	931	.078
												Conti	nued o	n next	page

		log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.058)	(.100)	(.14)	(.097)	(1.96)	(2.3)	(.14)	(.20)	(.13)	(.21)		(.48)		
(105)	Djibouti	$.94^{\dagger}$	49^{\dagger}	.30	044	2.2	-3.7	059	19	.081	1.20*	1.07	8.2^{\dagger}	806	.198
		(.094)	(.11)	(.13)	(.11)	(2.1)	(2.6)	(.15)	(.26)	(.12)	(.46)	(.72)	(.52)		
(106)	Ethiopia	.18*	26^{+}	$.59^{\dagger}$	080	.83	.64	11	.059	$.54^{\dagger}$.49		3.8^{\dagger}	1378	.158
		(.066)	(.14)	(.13)	(.12)	(3.2)	(4.1)	(.15)	(.26)	(.12)	(.30)		(.66)		
(107)	Ghana	.29*	48^{\dagger}	.28+	.031	.12	89	21	26	.12	.50	.15	5.8^{\dagger}	1429	.096
		(.100)	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	(2.6)	(2.6)	(.23)	(.30)	(.14)	(.23)	(.47)	(.76)		
(108)	Kenya	$.41^{\dagger}$	69^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$	005	-3.4^{+}	3.0	.13	.12	054	040	82	6.3^{\dagger}	1449	.161
		(.055)	(.090)	(.14)	(.085)	(1.86)	(2.3)	(.11)	(.17)	(.098)	(.33)	(.32)	(.41)		
(109)	Liberia	.24*	46^{\star}	$.69^{\dagger}$.033	70	.099	.042	76^{+}	$.45^{\dagger}$	$\boldsymbol{1.21^{\dagger}}$.28	5.4^{\dagger}	942	.109
		(.078)	(.18)	(.16)	(.17)	(2.6)	(3.0)	(.19)	(.41)	(.13)	(.31)	(1.06)	(.68)		
(110)	Madagascar	$.28^{\dagger}$	57^{\dagger}	.32	.066	-2.2	2.1	.19+	014	.10	.078	56	6.3^{\dagger}	1951	.112
(444)	25.1	(.046)	(.077)	(.16)	(.070)	(1.56)	(1.87)	(.10)	(.16)	(.080)	(.64)	(.27)	(.41)		
(111)	Malawi	$.31^{\dagger}$	22	23	.065	.67	21	19	19	.26+			6.2^{\dagger}	931	.053
(110)	3.6.19	(.077)	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.6)	(3.1)	(.18)	(.24)	(.15)	1 10 [†]	00‡	(.58)	1500	000
(112)	Mali	.037	37^{\dagger}	.44*	11	-3.8	4.0	.19	17	.39*	1.18^{\dagger}	$.98^{\dagger}$	4.1^{\dagger}	1799	.036
(110)	3.5	(.061)	(.097)	(.14)	(.095)	(1.47)	(1.65)	(.14)	(.24)	(.15)	(.22)	(.17)	(.42)		100
(113)	Mauritania	$.21^{\dagger}$	67^{\dagger}	12	073	4.4*	-4.0	−.33 *	−.55 *	$.54^{\dagger}$	$.98^{\dagger}$.17	5.1^{\dagger}	2200	.136
(111)	3.5 1.	(.059)	(.099)	(.12)	(.090)	(1.71)	(1.98)	(.12)	(.19)	(.092)	(.24)	(.40)	(.54)	1.050	105
(114)	Mozambique	.53†	57^{\dagger}	10	15^{+}	2.6+	-3.8	093	28^{+}	.16+	.31		7.0^{\dagger}	1672	.195
(115)	NT '1'	(.050)	(.091)	(.11)	(.083)	(1.41)	(1.53)	(.12)	(.16)	(.093)	(.38)	•	(.35)		110
(115)	Namibia	$.20^{\dagger}$	47^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$.16+	2.1	-2.1	063	11	.28+	.47+	<i>a</i>	4.9^{\dagger}	959	.113
												Conti	nued c	n next	page

		$\log(\mathrm{household\ income})$	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.045)	(.12)	(.12)	(.099)	(1.51)	(1.59)	(.13)	(.20)	(.16)	(.26)		(.40)		
(116)	Niger	$.18^{\dagger}$	72^{\dagger}	$.51^{\dagger}$	051	-1.64	1.58	.19+	0009	$.47^{\dagger}$.64		5.2^{\dagger}	1606	.093
		(.051)	(.088)	(.13)	(.083)	(1.33)	(1.57)	(.11)	(.22)	(.12)	(.44)		(.31)		
(117)	Nigeria	$oldsymbol{.24}^\dagger$	65^{\dagger}	.26	010	18	.56	071	18	.15	1.07^{\dagger}		5.8^{\dagger}	1426	.075
		(.062)	(.10)	(.11)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(.14)	(.28)	(.11)	(.29)		(.47)		
(118)	Rwanda	.30†	20	$.66^{\dagger}$.12	6.5*	-7.5^{*}	16	53	.36	1.48+		4.6^{\dagger}	693	.141
(1.1.0)	~ 1	(.062)	(.15)	(.18)	(.14)	(2.4)	(2.8)	(.19)	(.27)	(.16)	(.80)	0.00	(.50)	1050	
(119)	Senegal	$.42^{\dagger}$	60^{\dagger}	$.44^{\dagger}$	24^{\star}	65	1.16	022	26^{+}	$.28^{\dagger}$	1.76^{\dagger}	026	6.2^{\dagger}	1872	.179
((.051)	(.082)	(.092)	(.075)	(1.36)	(1.51)	(.098)	(.16)	(.083)	(.38)	(.10)	(.34)		
(120)	Sierra Leone	.093+	19^{+}	.22+	23	-2.6	2.5	.032	31	.37*	.67	-3.1^{\dagger}	7.8^{\dagger}	1813	.027
(4.24)	0 1 401	(.054)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(2.00)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.21)	(.11)	(.31)	(.20)	(.59)	400=	212
(121)	South Africa	$.54^{\dagger}$	64^{\dagger}	.079	.033	62	.44	.012	.029	.13	.51	.029	6.5^{\dagger}	1627	.213
(100)	Q 1	(.054)	(.11)	(.11)	(.099)	(1.57)	(1.73)	(.13)	(.16)	(.14)	(.21)	(.47)	(.39)	700	050
(122)	Sudan	.22†	−.57 [†]	.29	20	-3.9^{+}	5.7	083	006				6.3 [†]	763	.052
(123)	Syrian Arab	(.051) .46 [†]	(.14) 63*	.23	$\frac{(.12)}{27^{+}}$	(2.3) -4.3	(2.7)	.37	$\frac{(.32)}{019}$			26	(.47) 7.5 [†]	1167	.087
(123)	Republic													1107	.001
(124)	Togo	(.12) .44 [†]	$(.20)$ 58^{\dagger}	.21	.042	$\frac{(3.2)}{-1.53}$	$\frac{(4.2)}{1.26}$.073	(.28)	.31*	014	(.33) 1.94 *	(.65) 3.6 [†]	1343	.112
(124)	1080	(.071)	(.10)	(.14)	(.099)	-1.33 (1.87)	(2.1)	(.14)	(.21)	(.11)	014 (.36)	(.64)	(.79)	1949	.114
(125)	Tunisia	016	17	$\frac{(.14)}{63}$	011	. ,	30.1 [†]	.50	$\frac{(.21)}{-1.51}$	(.11)	(.30)	-6.2^{\dagger}		141	.185
(120)	1 dillold	(.12)	(.46)	(.41)	(.36)	(7.6)	(9.1)	(.41)	(1.11)			(.47)	(1.42)	111	.100
(126)	Uganda	.13+	47*	.86 [†]	30	2.2	$\frac{(3.1)}{-3.4}$.061	.33	$.60^{\dagger}$	1.99^{\dagger}	(.11)	4.9 [†]	906	.177
()	- 0	. = 0										Conti		n next	

		$\log(ext{household income})$	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
		(.080)	(.16)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.5)	(3.1)	(.19)	(.22)	(.13)	(.43)		(.55)		
$\overline{(127)}$	Tanzania	$.36^{\dagger}$	62^{\dagger}	.22	.072	-3.4	3.3	.46*	.47+	$.69^{\dagger}$.47		5.3^{\dagger}	543	.192
		(.084)	(.15)	(.14)	(.15)	(4.1)	(5.4)	(.16)	(.24)	(.16)	(.55)		(.77)		
(128)	Zambia	.21*	58^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$.11	.98	-2.2	.13	094	.31*	.59*	-1.23	7.0^{\dagger}	2009	.114
		(.072)	(.12)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.2)	(2.7)	(.18)	(.27)	(.11)	(.21)	(.57)	(.79)		
(129)	Zimbabwe	$.28^{\dagger}$	68^{\dagger}	.34	068	-4.4^{+}	3.6	16	28	24	37		6.9^{\dagger}	1645	.099
(-, , , -, -)		(.059)	(.15)	(.27)	(.15)	(2.6)	(2.5)	(.17)	(.24)	(.23)	(.33)		(.71)		
$\langle 94\text{-}129 \rangle$	Africa	$.33^{\dagger}$	55^{\dagger}	.29†	035^{+}	−. <i>70</i> *	.47		087^{*}	$.23^{\dagger}$	$.20^{\dagger}$	20^{\dagger}	6.0^{\dagger}	45829	
(1.5.5)		(.011)	(.019)	(.023)	(.018)	(.33)	(.38)	(.024)	(.039)	(.021)	(.053)	(.057)	(.081)		
(130)	Egypt	$.48^{\dagger}$	87^{\dagger}	.28	79^{\dagger}	-8.3	9.1	.47+	11	.062	.19	$.57^{+}$	8.3^{\dagger}	1069	.153
(101)		(.090)	(.15)	(.17)	(.14)	(3.4)	(3.5)	(.27)	(.38)	(.19)	(.23)	(.33)	(.67)		
(131)	Iran	$.56^{\dagger}$	90^{\dagger}	.20+	46^{\dagger}	-6.1^{\star}	6.6*	.42*	.13	.16	.38+	.16	7.2^{\dagger}	1905	.125
(100)	T 1	(.076)	(.12)	(.11)	(.098)	(2.2)	(2.6)	(.15)	(.29)	(.17)	(.20)	(1.04)	(1.11)	1000	105
(132)	Israel	$.75^{\dagger}$	73^{\dagger}	046	.016	-3.9^{+}	2.9	.18	.019	.37	.43	13	8.6 [†]	1339	.125
(199)	T 1	(.10)	(.19)	(.11)	(.11)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.25)	(.39)	(.40)	(.15)	(.50)	0.00	100
(133)	Jordan		-1.17^{\dagger}	016	35*	83	.99	24	76^{+}	049	.25	.36	7.4 [†]	969	.109
(134)	Lebanon	(.12) .96 [†]	(.21) 43 ⁺	(.18) .53*	(.13)	(2.1) -12.3^{\dagger}	(2.6) 12.5 *	.28	.45	.16	.68*	(1.99)	(.55)	896	.192
(194)	Lebanon	(.13)	43 (.24)	(.17)	42 (.16)	(3.6)	(4.4)	(.25)	(.56)	(.20)	(.26)		8.4^{\dagger} (.65)	090	.192
(135)	Qatar	.61 [†]	$\frac{(.24)}{45^{+}}$.16	26	. ,	13.7 [*]	.044	-1.20	1.23*	1.38 [†]	1.02	6.9 [†]	705	.212
(100)	Carai.	(.097)	(.26)	(.13)	(.13)	(4.1)	(5.3)	(.18)	(.49)	(.39)	(.39)	(.43)	(.77)	100	.212
(136)	Saudi Arabia	.035	$\frac{(.20)}{099}$.13	$\frac{(.13)}{044}$		$\frac{(0.0)}{-1.40}$	$\frac{(.13)}{025}$.050	$\frac{(.33)}{25}$	$\frac{(.33)}{14}$	(.10)	5.9 [†]	1061	.0007
(100)												Conti		n next	

	log(household income)	not enough money (food)	donated money	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
	(.073)	(.17)	(.10)	(.098)	(2.9)	(3.8)	(.14)	(.28)	(.12)	(.16)		(.51)		
$\langle 130\text{-}136 \rangle$ Persia and	$.49^{\dagger}$	72^{\dagger}	.15*	29^{\dagger}	-4.5^{\dagger}	4.8^{\dagger}	.11+	11	.012	.27*	.089	7.5^{\dagger}	7944	
Mid-east	(.035)	(.065)	(.048)	(.045)	(1.01)	(1.17)	(.064)	(.13)	(.069)	(.088)	(.13)	(.23)		
(1-136) All countries	$.38^{\dagger}$	66^{\dagger}	$.25^{\dagger}$	12^{\dagger}	-3.5^{\dagger}	3.4^{\dagger}	.041*	15^{\dagger}	$.20^{\dagger}$	$.33^{\dagger}$	32^{\dagger}	7.4^{\dagger}	179714	
	(.006)	(.012)	(.011)	(.009)	(.17)	(.19)	(.013)	(.021)	(.012)	(.019)	(.026)	(.041)		

Table S-3: Country-level estimates for life evaluation, using income-corrected versions of donations and food inadequacy. Shaded rows show confidence-weighted means over all countries in a region. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance:	$0.1\%^{\dagger}$	1%*	5%	10%+

		$\log(\mathrm{household\ income})$	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2({ m adj})$
(1)	Albania	$.96^{\dagger}$	-1.01^\dagger	081	086	-1.76	1.29	024	013	18	.26		7.3^{\dagger}	763	.220
		(.11)	(.17)	(.17)	(.14)	(2.5)	(2.7)	(.20)	(.34)	(.17)	(.23)	•	(.56)		
$\overline{(2)}$	Armenia	$.62^{\dagger}$	47^{\dagger}	.15	080	-2.1	.62	32^{+}	55	045	018	1.65	7.6^{\dagger}	858	.212
		(.074)	(.13)	(.22)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(.18)	(.24)	(.19)	(.22)	(1.24)	(.46)		
(3)	Azerbaijan	$.87^{\dagger}$	-1.04^\dagger	$.55^{\dagger}$.034	-5.2^{+}	4.5	.12	17	.41	.32	.62	7.9^{\dagger}	802	.248
		(.10)	(.15)	(.15)	(.13)	(2.8)	(3.3)	(.20)	(.35)	(.21)	(.25)	(.45)	(.51)		
(4)	Belarus	$.47^{\dagger}$	99^{\dagger}	$.66^{\dagger}$.019	-3.2^{+}	2.6	037	25	10	.089	55	7.4^{\dagger}	1215	.142
/= \		(.087)	(.12)	(.18)	(.10)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(.17)	(.20)	(.19)	(.21)	(.43)	(.43)		100
(5)	Bosnia and	$.72^{\dagger}$	69^{\star}	.68 [†]	.048	-12.5^{\dagger}	11.1^{\dagger}	.30	.17	.16	.43+		9.2^{\dagger}	1538	.162
(0)	Herzegovina	(.094)	(.24)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.4)	(2.5)	(.19)	(.28)	(.16)	(.26)		(.51)		
(6)	Bulgaria	$.64^{\dagger}$	79^{\dagger}	.29+	088	-5.6	4.7+	30	59	$.45^{\star}$.72*		6.3^{\dagger}	780	.228
<u>/=\</u>		(.11)	(.15)	(.17)	(.14)	(2.5)	(2.4)	(.24)	(.29)	(.16)	(.24)		(.55)		100
(7)	Croatia	.67 [†]	76 [⋆]	.34	037	-8.5^{\dagger}	6.8 *	037	29	009	.82*		8.9	803	.163
(0)	E / :	(.11)	(.25)	(.16)	(.15)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(.22)	(.33)	(.20)	(.27)		(.56)	1000	150
(8)	Estonia	.73†	−.60 [†]	.33*	034	-5.6 [†]	4.8*	14	070	.005	.28		7.7	1960	.152
		(.068)	(.11)	(.11)	(.075)	(1.48)	(1.54)	(.12)	(.15)	(.10)	(.13)	Conti	(.30)	n next	2000
												Conti	пиеа о	и пехт	page

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(9)	Georgia	$.77^{\dagger}$	-1.07^{\dagger}	.093	12	−4.1 *	3.5	.007	29	.11	.040	57^{\dagger}	7.5^{\dagger}	1821	.243
·		(.054)	(.090)	(.19)	(.086)	(1.43)	(1.48)	(.11)	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.085)	(.30)		
(10)	Hungary	$.96^{\dagger}$	-1.23^{\dagger}	.30	17	-8.0^{\dagger}	7.2^{\dagger}	083	.021	.31	$.82^{\dagger}$	-3.0^{\star}	7.9^{\dagger}	1451	.195
(11)		(.11)	(.18)	(.14)	(.12)	(2.0)	(1.95)	(.27)	(.28)	(.16)	(.21)	(1.01)	(.49)		
(11)	Kazakhstan	.14	-1.01^{\dagger}	.080	039	-2.3	1.61	15	44	.36	.48	-1.40^{\dagger}	6.7^{\dagger}	664	.111
(10)	T7	(.10)	(.18)	(.24)	(.17)	(2.8)	(3.0)	(.24)	(.34)	(.31)	(.32)	(.33)	(.59)	1010	100
(12)	Kyrgyzstan	$.39^{\dagger}$	80^{\dagger}	.29	.017	-5.3^{\star}	4.6*	.22	.025	.13	.24	.087	7.0^{\dagger}	1812	.129
(10)	T	(.051)	(.091)	(.14)	(.086)	(1.64)	(1.72)	(.15)	(.19)	(.13)	(.16)	(.97)	(1.04)	1044	001
(13)	Latvia	.67	74^{\dagger}	.43†	028	-7.8^{\dagger}	6.6†	.12	.019	.21	.43†	1.51 [†]	5.8 [†]	1944	.231
(14)	Lithuania	(.061) .73 [†]	$(.11)$ -1.22^{\dagger}	(.10) -40	(.073) 087	(1.46) -5.4^{\dagger}	(1.56) 4.2 *	$\frac{(.11)}{089}$	$\frac{(.13)}{17}$.096)	(.12) .37	$(.38)$ -4.0^{\dagger}	(.48) 12.4 [†]	1924	.216
(14)	Litiitailia	(.067)	(.13)	(.17)	(.083)	-3.4 (1.41)	(1.40)	(.12)	17 (.15)	(.12)	(.15)	(.22)	(.35)	1924	.210
(15)	Montenegro	.26	7 4	1.33 [†]	.21	$\frac{(1.41)}{-6.6}$	6.6	.023	14	.96	.91+	(.22)	6.1 [†]	548	.132
(10)	Montenegro	(.22)	(.31)	(.32)	(.26)	(4.9)	(5.3)	(.32)	(.50)	(.41)	(.48)		(1.16)	040	.102
(16)	Poland	.75	73^{\dagger}	.49 [†]	22	-6.4^{\dagger}	4.8	.018	28	11	.036	.58*	9.2	1167	.220
(-0)		(.080)	(.14)	(.11)	(.11)	(1.93)	(1.92)	(.16)	(.21)	(.15)	(.19)	(.20)	(.38)	,	
$\overline{(17)}$	Republic of	$.45^{\dagger}$	68^{\dagger}	.14	031	-2.6	1.82	14	21	12	.25	62	8.0 [†]	1640	.125
` /	Moldova	(.058)	(.10)	(.14)	(.096)	(1.85)	(1.87)	(.17)	(.21)	(.13)	(.17)	(.63)	(.73)		
(18)	Romania	$.76^{\dagger}$	-1.25^{\dagger}	$.76^{\dagger}$	−.36 *	-2.1	1.54	49	−.85 *	.44	1.00^{\dagger}	−.83 *	7.6^{\dagger}	728	.371
		(.095)	(.14)	(.20)	(.13)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(.24)	(.33)	(.20)	(.26)	(.27)	(.56)		
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		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(adj)$
(19)	Russian Federation	$.65^{\dagger}$	85^{\dagger}	.36+	091	-6.8^{\dagger}	5.3^{\dagger}	022	037	.12	.41*	.38	7.3^{\dagger}	3180	.189
(20)	C 1:	(.051)	(.087)	(.19)	(.073)	(1.36)	(1.44)	(.11)	(.14)	(.14)	(.15)	(1.02)	(1.05)	1007	100
(20)	Serbia	.94†	63 [⋆]	.20	093	- 5.8	6.0	27	49 ⁺	.28+	.37		7.8 [†]	1267	.196
(21)	Slovakia	(.10) .90 [†]	$(.20)$ -1.07^{\dagger}	(.19)	$\frac{(.13)}{050}$	(2.8) -12.9^{\dagger}	(2.9) 10.7^{\dagger}	(.22) .67 [†]	(.29) .70*	.25	.47 ⁺		(.57) 8.8 [†]	818	.220
(21)	Siovakia	(.14)	(.22)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(.20)	(.27)	(.18)	(.25)		(.48)	010	.220
(22)	Slovenia		-1.09^{\dagger}	.40	036	-16.7^{\dagger}	14.9^{\dagger}	.33	.049	.67 [†]	1.04 [†]		9.8	858	.262
(22)	Sioveina	(.13)	(.32)	(.16)	(.15)	(2.8)	(3.0)	(.25)	(.32)	(.19)	(.25)		(.49)	000	.202
(23)	Tajikistan	.73†	75^{\dagger}	.18	.16	75	099	071	.038	062	.16	42	7.9 [†]	867	.262
(-)	.,	(.056)	(.11)	(.12)	(.11)	(1.55)	(1.59)	(.16)	(.25)	(.14)	(.21)	(.33)	(.34)		
(24)	Ukraine	$.46^{\dagger}$	48^{\dagger}	.41+	.034	1.04	-2.9	52^{\star}	56^{\star}	.035	.51*	50^{\dagger}	6.8^{\dagger}	2102	.140
	•	(.091)	(.11)	(.22)	(.10)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(.17)	(.21)	(.18)	(.19)	(.14)	(.43)		
(25)	Uzbekistan	$.36^{\dagger}$	69^{\dagger}	.13	19	-7.4^{\dagger}	8.5^{\dagger}	.25	28	$.48^{\dagger}$.44	.27	6.8^{\dagger}	1720	.095
		(.058)	(.093)	(.12)	(.095)	(1.99)	(2.2)	(.17)	(.25)	(.13)	(.19)	(.47)	(.61)		
$\langle 1\text{-}25 \rangle$	FSU and E Europe	$.63^{\dagger}$	83^{\dagger}	$.33^{\dagger}$ -	059*	-5.4^{\dagger}	4.4^{\dagger}	018	16^{\dagger}	$.14^{\dagger}$	$.37^{\dagger}$	64^{\dagger}	8.1^{\dagger}	33230	
(2.0)		(.015)	(.026)	(.030)	(.021)	(.39)	(.40)	(.033)	(.043)	(.031)	(.039)	(.058)	(.095)		
(26)	Austria	.23+	.034	.47*	13	-9.1^{\dagger}	8.4 [*]	.53	29	.57	.66	76^{\dagger}	9.0^{\dagger}	624	.087
(97)	D-1-:	(.12)	(.34)	(.17)	(.15)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(.21)	(.30)	(.40)	(.44)	(.22)	(.69)	F10	110
(27)	Belgium	.21+	76 [⋆]	.19+	16	-3.5^{+}	3.3+	.40+	007	.97	1.14		6.9 [†]	513	.119
		(.12)	(.25)	(.11)	(.12)	(1.97)	(1.89)	(.21)	(.30)	(.43)	(.46)	Conti	(.59)		

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	m dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(28)	Cyprus	.61	-1.35^{\dagger}	.35	27+	-4.2^{+}	4.7+	.17	041	.52	.70		7.1^{\dagger}	810	.122
(20)	D 1	(.12)	(.40)	(.15)	(.15)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(.23)	(.31)	(.25)	(.30)	0.5+	(.59)		
(29)	Denmark		-1.19^{+}	.25	068	-3.7	4.1	.62†	084	.17	.011	-2.5 *	8.3†	820	.090
(30)	Finland	(.072) .47 [†]	(.64) 8 7 *	(.11) .25*	(.095)	(1.71) - 5.1 *	(1.71)	.18	(.23) 12	(.30) 12	(.32) 13	(.95)	(.52) 9.5 [†]	760	.144
(30)	гшана	(.13)	(.30)	(.096)	20 (.099)	(1.82)	4.7	(.16)	12 (.18)	12 (.23)	15 (.25)		(.53)	700	.144
(31)	France	.41*	86*	030	30	-6.6^{\dagger}	(1.85) 5.6 *	.53*	.048	$\frac{(.23)}{36}$	$\frac{(.23)}{17}$	-1.81^{\dagger}	9.0 [†]	801	.113
(01)	Trance	(.13)	(.32)	(.14)	(.13)	(1.69)	(1.78)	(.16)	(.25)	(.29)	(.31)	(.23)	(.45)	001	.110
(32)	Germany	.57 [†]	-1.37^{\dagger}	.38*	19	-11.8^{\dagger}	10.5 [†]	.28	035	.26+	.54*	90	9.7	670	.165
(9-)	G-52-11-1-J	(.14)	(.32)	(.15)	(.13)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(.18)	(.23)	(.16)	(.20)	(1.38)	(.48)	0.0	
(33)	Iceland	$.50^{\dagger}$	-1.64^{\dagger}	$.64^{\dagger}$	10	-13.8^{\dagger}	12.7^{\dagger}	$.95^{\dagger}$	096	11	.16		10.1^{\dagger}	409	.256
` /		(.13)	(.33)	(.19)	(.17)	(3.0)	(3.3)	(.25)	(.43)	(.21)	(.22)	'	(.55)		
(34)	Ireland	.10	87^{*}	.002	.087	-1.86	2.6	.26	43^{+}	34	42		8.3^{\dagger}	694	.065
		(.085)	(.27)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.2)	(2.2)	(.17)	(.25)	(.25)	(.26)		(.54)		
$\overline{(35)}$	Italy	.29	-1.07^{\dagger}	.21	041	-2.6	1.54	.37	.057	.33	.61	1.20	7.4^{\dagger}	507	.096
		(.12)	(.28)	(.21)	(.25)	(2.7)	(3.2)	(.26)	(.38)	(.49)	(.55)	(.56)	(.62)		
(36)	Kosovo	$.80^{\dagger}$	51^{\dagger}	$.74^{\dagger}$	15	-4.3	3.0	.19		054	.11		8.3^{\dagger}	1793	.168
(97)	T 1	(.080)	(.14)	(.10)	(.10)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.32)	(.12)	(.20)	1	(.42)		
(37)	Luxembourg	.36	97	.32	35^{+}	2.5	-2.5	.20	034	39	17		6.9^{\dagger}	255	.074
		(.32)	(.82)	(.22)	(.19)	(4.5)	(4.3)	(.31)	(.33)	(.32)	(.40)	Conti	(1.08)		

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(38)	Macedonia	$.82^{\dagger}$	24	.13	24 ·	-15.5^{\dagger}	14.6^{\dagger}	.12	13	.33+	.61		9.5^{\dagger}	914	.160
		(.14)	(.24)	(.16)	(.16)	(3.0)	(3.0)	(.26)	(.41)	(.18)	(.29)		(.59)		
(39)	Malta	.29+	-1.60^{\dagger}	29	88 [⋆]	-3.6	3.9		-1.23^{+}	.066	.34	.075	7.9^{\dagger}	204	.189
(, -)		(.17)	(.40)	(.35)	(.28)	(4.5)	(4.7)	(.37)	(.67)	(.39)	(.48)	(1.07)	(.90)		
(40)	Netherlands	$.35^{\dagger}$	80	.002	.021	-4.1^*	4.2^{\star}	.41*	.28	.013	.033		8.3^{\dagger}	831	.095
(, ,)		(.073)	(.36)	(.11)	(.091)	(1.53)	(1.53)	(.14)	(.19)	(.10)	(.11)		(.31)		
(41)	Norway	.047	-1.25^{\dagger}	.041	11	-2.5	2.9	$.66^{\dagger}$.064	13	.033	-2.6^{\dagger}	7.9^{\dagger}	817	.106
		(.043)	(.33)	(.11)	(.10)	(1.96)	(1.94)	(.17)	(.21)	(.16)	(.16)	(.65)	(.41)		
(42)	Portugal	$.72^{\dagger}$	-1.05^{\dagger}	$.72^{\dagger}$.079	-8.1^{\star}	5.9	096	15	.077	.29 -		10.0^{\dagger}	1284	.230
(40)		(.10)	(.24)	(.17)	(.13)	(2.6)	(2.4)	(.24)	(.31)	(.17)	(.22)	(.26)	(.61)		
(43)	Spain	.31*	83	11	045	-6.3	6.2 ⁺	.59	.38	.63*	.53	.10	8.2^{\dagger}	564	.080
(44)	Q 1	(.11)	(.40)	(.17)	(.16)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(.28)	(.36)	(.23)	(.25)	(.50)	(.66)		104
(44)	Sweden	.19+	-1.17^{\dagger}	.23+	097	-4.1	4.6*	.59 [†]	.25	.12	.23	-2.9	8.0 [†]	833	.134
(45)	C : 1 1	(.11)	(.29)	(.12)	(.12)	(1.84)	(1.78)	(.17)	(.22)	(.16)	(.16)	(1.30)	(.46)	017	.116
(45)	Switzerland	.77†	91 [†]	.24	16	-4.2^{+}	5.5	064	40^{+}	.10	.24		8.4	817	.110
(46)	Turkey	(.10) .56 [†]	$(.27)$ -1.15^{\dagger}	$\frac{(.15)}{054}$	$(.12)$ 30^{+}	(2.3) -7.7	(2.3) 7.5	(.17)	(.24) 28	.099	(.24) - .94		(.45) 7.8 [†]	864	.101
(40)	тигкеу							.55						ou4	.101
(47)	United Kingdom	(.13) .33 [†]	(.17) 92 [†]	(.24) .48 [†]	(.18) 20	(3.0) -3.8	(3.3) 5.0 *	.23+	$\frac{(.50)}{26}$.41	.61		(.60) 7.1 [†]	1524	.120
(41)	Omited Ixingdom	(.057)	(.18)	(.12)	(.094)	-3.6 (1.72)	(1.78)	(.12)	20 (.16)	(.49)	(.49)		(.60)	1924	.120
		(.007)	(.10)	(.12)	(.094)	(1.72)	(1.10)	(.12)	(.10)	(.49)	(.49)	Conti		n next	nage
												COHU	naca o	11 110.70	Page

		$\log(\text{household income})$	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	$q_{ m NoSWL}$	constant	obs.	$R^2(adj)$
$\langle 26\text{-}47 \rangle$	European	$.33^{\dagger}$	89^{\dagger}	$.26^{\dagger}$	13^{\dagger}	-5.3^{\dagger}	${f 5.2}^\dagger$	$.35^{\dagger}$	067	.076+	.16*	-1.23^{\dagger}	8.4^{\dagger}	17308	
	Countries	(.020)	(.057)	(.029)	(.027)	(.47)	(.47)	(.041)	(.056)	(.042)	(.050)	(.12)	(.11)		
(48)	Australia	$.42^{\dagger}$	-1.19^{\dagger}	$.42^{\dagger}$	19^{+}	-4.7 ⁺	6.0	041	51	.053	033		8.2^{\dagger}	1024	.165
		(.10)	(.23)	(.11)	(.10)	(2.7)	(3.0)	(.15)	(.23)	(.41)	(.42)		(.62)		
(49)	Canada		-1.13^{\dagger}	.27*	39^{\dagger}	-8.7^{\dagger}	9.3^{\dagger}	.41*	25	.012	.14		9.3^{\dagger}	1994	.151
()		(.075)	(.28)	(.11)	(.090)	(1.71)	(1.78)	(.13)	(.18)	(.19)	(.19)		(.36)		
(50)	New Zealand	.33*	91^{\dagger}	.27	47^{\dagger}	-5.9^{\star}	6.4^{\star}	.20	080	18	054	10	9.1^{\dagger}	612	.096
		(.12)	(.25)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(.21)	(.29)	(.15)	(.14)	(.21)	(.43)		
(51)	United States of	43^{\dagger}	-1.30^{\dagger}	.23+	14	-9.7^{\dagger}	10.2^{\dagger}	$.62^{\dagger}$.16	.23	.15	37^{\dagger}	9.2^{\dagger}	1872	.162
/ 10 81)	America	(.074)	(.27)	(.12)	(.11)	(1.68)	(1.63)	(.18)	(.22)	(.47)	(.48)	(.10)	(.54)		
$\langle 48\text{-}51 \rangle$	USA, Canada,	$.41^{\dagger}$	-1.13^{\dagger}	$.30^{\dagger}$	29^{\dagger}	-7.9^{\dagger}	8.7^{\dagger}	$.29^{\dagger}$	19^{+}	072	.022	32^{\dagger}	9.1^{\dagger}	5502	
(50)	Aus., and NZ	(.044)	(.13)	(.059)	(.053)	(.97)	(.99)	(.080)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.091)	(.23)	770	100
(52)	Argentina	.028	−.78 *	.20	43	-6.2^{+}	5.0^{+}	16	24	.84*	1.56^{\dagger}		7.3^{\dagger}	773	.126
<u>/F9\</u>	D 1'	(.11)	(.24)	(.24)	(.19)	(3.2)	(3.0)	(.29)	(.39)	(.27)	(.39)	20	(.72)	0.07	100
(53)	Belize	.11	051	.58*	098	-3.5	3.5	.45	40	.49	1.18	.39	7.0 [†]	267	.108
<u>(F4)</u>	D - 1::-	(.16)	(.22)	(.21)	(.18)	(4.7)	(6.2)	(.22)	(.39)	(.19)	(.49)	(1.77)	(.88)	1640	119
(54)	Bolivia	.53†	48 [†]	.21	11	-5.1*	5.0*	20	23	.24	.48*		7.9 [†]	1649	.113
(55)	Chile	(.062) .79 [†]	(.10) 98 [†]	.064	(.095)	-3.1	(1.93)	026	(.23) 10	(.12) .54 [†]	(.18) .60*	75^{\dagger}	(.36) 8.2 [†]	1893	.215
(99)	Omie	(.079)	(.15)	(.12)	094 (.12)		(2.3)	020 (.16)	10 (.23)	(.15)	(.21)			1099	.215
		(.079)	(.13)	(.12)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(.10)	(.23)	(.15)	(.21)	(.18)	(.48)		

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$({ m age}/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(56)	Colombia	.46†	−.75 [†]	.29*	100	-6.9^{\dagger}	6.8†	073	31	.45†	.75†	-5.1^{\dagger}		2559	.129
(57)	Costa Rica	(.068) .45 [†]	(.11) 99 [†]	.14	$\frac{(.10)}{056}$	$\frac{(1.61)}{-3.7^{+}}$	$\frac{(1.77)}{3.4}$	(.12) 10	(.19) 26	.11	.17	(.42) -1.43	(.59) 9.6 [†]	664	.135
(01)	Costa Trica	(.084)	(.16)	(.12)	(.12)	(1.94)	(2.1)	(.15)	(.27)	(.14)	(.20)	(1.03)	(.43)	004	.100
(58)	Dominican	.60 [†]	−.93 [†]	.32+		-12.9^{\dagger}	12.9 [†]	14	32	.46	1.04	(1.00)	8.9	1625	.129
()	Republic	(.087)	(.17)	(.18)	(.16)	(2.4)	(2.6)	(.20)	(.25)	(.19)	(.21)	_	(.56)		
(59)	Ecuador	.86†	45^{\dagger}	.13	.025	-3.1	2.2	.013	11	.34*	.63 [†]		7.8^{\dagger}	1951	.224
		(.052)	(.093)	(.10)	(.085)	(1.44)	(1.55)	(.12)	(.18)	(.11)	(.16)	•	(.33)		
(60)	El Salvador	$.53^{\dagger}$	61^{\dagger}	$.38^{\dagger}$	27^{\star}	-2.9	2.1	094	.004	$.47^{\dagger}$.50*	64	8.1^{\dagger}	2432	.152
		(.060)	(.085)	(.11)	(.083)	(1.31)	(1.43)	(.100)	(.17)	(.10)	(.18)	(.81)	(.88)		
(61)	Guatemala	$.43^{\dagger}$	37	.14	.018	-4.7	4.0^{+}	.052	19	.28+	.30		8.4^{\dagger}	1287	.065
		(.081)	(.16)	(.12)	(.13)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.28)	(.15)	(.23)	1	(.46)		
(62)	Guyana	.27	81	.43	71^{*}	2.2	-2.9	57^{+}	95	23	.81*	-1.42^{+}	7.3^{\dagger}	209	.107
(00)	TT 1.1	(.19)	(.36)	(.27)	(.25)	(4.5)	(5.1)	(.31)	(.47)	(.31)	(.31)	(.81)	(1.02)	7 00	000
(63)	Haiti	15 ⁺	.009	077	.11	2.3	-1.96	.35+	23	.59 [†]	1.05^{\dagger}		2.2^{\dagger}	722	.032
(64)	II J	(.080)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(3.1)	(3.7)	(.20)	(.29)	(.17)	(.29)	1 07	(.60)	1595	1.40
(64)	Honduras	.48†	-1.05^{\dagger}	.23+	28	-3.9^{+}	3.2	13	32	.48*	.88*	-1.07	9.0	1535	.149
(65)	Mexico	(.076) .62 [†]	(.14) 81 [†]	(.13) .32*	(.13) 36 [†]	(2.1) -1.44	$\frac{(2.4)}{031}$	$\frac{(.16)}{045}$.12	.24	(.29) .41	$\frac{(.53)}{1.65^{+}}$	(.74) 6.7 [†]	1691	.209
(00)	MEXICO	(.066)	(.12)	(.12)	(.097)	-1.44 (1.83)	031 (2.1)	045	(.22)	(.12)	(.17)	(.84)	(.92)	1091	.209
		(.000)	(.12)	(.12)	(.031)	(1.03)	(2.1)	(.13)	(.22)	(.14)	(.11)	` /	_ ` ′	n novt	naga

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	$_{ m NoSML}$	constant	obs.	$R^2(adj)$
(66)	Nicaragua	$.75^{\dagger}$	73^{\dagger}	.031	43^{\dagger}	−6.2 *	6.0*	29	59	$.46^{\dagger}$.45	76		1828	.197
(67)	Panama	(.067) .55 [†]	(.11) 83 [†]	(.12)	(.11)	(1.92)	(2.3)	(.13)	(.25)	(.14)	(.19)	$\frac{(.30)}{73}$	(.39)	785	.164
(67)	Panama			.45†	053		-4.1	15	.17	.49*				189	.104
(68)	Paraguay	(.086) .49 [†]	(.13) 82 [†]	(.12) .25*	(.12) 010	(1.86) -7.8^{\dagger}	(2.0) 6.2 [†]	$\frac{(.15)}{042}$.057	(.18)	(.24)	(.75) 22	(.48) 8.3 [†]	2336	.221
(00)	1 araguay	(.045)	(.10)	(.095)	(.092)	(1.36)	(1.42)	042 (.12)	(.18)			(.13)	(.29)	2550	.221
(69)	Peru	.67 [†]	45^{\dagger}	.28	12	-6.8^{\dagger}	6.0*	29	17	.16	.46	, ,	10.5 [†]	2629	.173
(00)	1014	(.065)	(.10)	(.12)	(.099)	(1.71)	(1.92)	(.13)	(.22)	(.15)	(.19)	(.26)	(.46)	2020	.110
(70)	Puerto Rico	.34	-1.24^{\dagger}	.47+	48^{+}	-5.5	6.3	24	075	1.33^{\dagger}	1.53*	()	7.0 [†]	440	.101
()		(.17)	(.32)	(.28)	(.28)	(4.1)	(4.1)	(.39)	(.40)	(.38)	(.50)		(.91)		
(71)	Trinidad and	$.65^{\dagger}$	78^{\dagger}	37^{+}	14	-5.6^{+}	5.1	.21	.097	.14	18		7.4^{\dagger}	574	.129
, ,	Tobago	(.15)	(.23)	(.22)	(.21)	(3.4)	(3.9)	(.26)	(.39)	(.26)	(.43)		(.69)		
(72)	Uruguay	.34*	87^{\dagger}	$.29^{+}$.017	-4.6	3.6^{+}	.15	40	.16	.67+	-1.08^{*}	7.9^{\dagger}	622	.125
		(.10)	(.17)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(.20)	(.26)	(.17)	(.37)	(.39)	(.58)		
(73)	Venezuela	$.23^{\dagger}$	56^{\dagger}	043	13	-3.3^{+}	3.5^{+}	.15	008	.17	.59*		7.6^{\dagger}	1558	.055
(11.55.)		(.045)	(.15)	(.16)	(.12)	(1.98)	(2.1)	(.15)	(.24)	(.17)	(.23)		(.43)		
$\langle 52\text{-}73 \rangle$	Latin America and	$.50^{\dagger}$	66^{\dagger}	$.21^{\dagger}$	15^{\dagger}	-4.4^{\dagger}	3.7^{\dagger} -	066^{*}	15^{\star}	$.36^{\dagger}$	$.58^{\dagger}$	93^{\dagger}	8.3^{\dagger}	30029	
(7.4)	Caribbean	(.015)	(.029)	(.029)	(.025)	(.42)	(.46)	(.033)	(.052)	(.033)	(.049)	(.086)	(.11)	005	110
(74)	Afghanistan	.29†	20	.64	086	5.1	-6.9	29	39	.53*	.89*	48		905	.113
		(.081)	(.12)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.5)	(3.1)	(.18)	(.29)	(.16)	(.29)	(.44)	(.49)		

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(75)	Bangladesh	.71†	57 [†]	.17	36 [†]	-3.9*	4.6*	.082	23	.18	022	.53†	7.2†	3188	.162
(76)	Cambodia	(.054) .37 [†]	(.084) 67 [†]	(.078) .38 [†]	$\frac{(.071)}{077}$	(1.33)	(1.40) -2.8	27	(.24) 66 [†]	.036	.24	(.10)	(.32) 5.6 [†]	1771	.144
(.0)	Callisoula	(.039)	(.082)	(.084)	(.081)	(2.2)	(2.7)	(.13)	(.18)	(.087)	(.18)	•	(.39)		
(77)	China	.55 [†]	64^{\dagger}	.26	002	-4.9^{*}	6.2^{\dagger}			.15	.35		7.2^{\dagger}	3253	.137
` /		(.045)	(.13)	(.10)	(.080)	(1.57)	(1.71)			(.093)	(.15)		(.35)		
$\overline{(78)}$	Hong Kong	$.82^{\dagger}$	-1.16^{\dagger}	.17	046	-12.6^{\dagger}	13.2^{\dagger}	.41	.33	.40	.66*		8.0^{\dagger}	1161	.230
		(.080)	(.24)	(.12)	(.11)	(2.5)	(2.9)	(.20)	(.34)	(.18)	(.23)		(.45)		
(79)	India	$.74^{\dagger}$	43^{\dagger}	.29*	14^{+}	-2.7	3.4	.067	33	$.29^{\dagger}$.40*	79^{\dagger}	8.8^{\dagger}	4437	.180
		(.065)	(.11)	(.088)	(.084)	(1.85)	(2.2)	(.11)	(.32)	(.086)	(.13)	(.19)	(.40)		
(80)	Indonesia	$.48^{\dagger}$	56^{\dagger}	.19*	089	073	23	17	42	.026	.40	-1.04^{\dagger}	7.6^{\dagger}	2952	.128
(0.1)		(.047)	(.075)	(.066)	(.066)	(1.15)	(1.25)	(.10)	(.17)	(.074)	(.18)	(.27)	(.35)		
(81)	Japan	$.71^{\dagger}$	-1.14^{\dagger}	.22*	42^{\dagger}	-3.6	3.6	.38*	.19	.13	.46*	-1.06^{\dagger}	7.9^{\dagger}	2924	.142
(00)	I D 11 D D	(.073)	(.21)	(.085)	(.079)	(1.77)	(1.79)	(.12)	(.19)	(.15)	(.16) .21 ⁺	(.17)	(.41)	1000	157
(82)	Lao People's D.R.	.15†	37 [†]	.049	16*	.47	55	087	−.66 [†]	.077		82 [†]	6.4	1826	.157
(83)	Malaysia	(.038) .27 [†]	(.079) 86 [†]	(.066) .24*	13	(1.36) -1.74	(1.62)	(.092) 24	(.17) 24	.26	(.11)	(.10) - 1.64 *	(.28) 7.0 [†]	1507	.105
(00)	waiay sia	(.068)	(.22)	(.091)	15 (.088)	-1.74 (1.84)	(2.2)	(.12)	24 (.33)	(.10)	(.14)	(.51)	(.34)	1907	.100
(84)	Mongolia	.58 [†]	82^{\dagger}	.18	$\frac{(.088)}{19^{+}}$	-7.7^{\dagger}	8.8 [†]	.38	.080	.092	.19	(.51)	7.4 [†]	878	.166
(04)	Mongona	(.089)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(.19)	(.27)	(.15)	(.16)		(.47)	010	.100
		(.555)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(.10)	(.21)	(.10)	(.10)	Conti		n novt	nago

		$\log(\mathrm{household\ income})$	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(85)	Nepal	$.70^{\dagger}$	83^{\dagger}	.15+	43^{\dagger}	.30	.23	−.39 *	48	.31*	.67	1.73^{\dagger}	5.6^{\dagger}	1843	.230
(00)	D-1-1-4	(.073)	(.14)	(.081)	(.085)	(1.51)	(1.67)	.12	(.21) 59	(.10)	(.30)	(.11)	(.48)	2502	109
(86)	Pakistan		-1.12^{\dagger}	.38*	39*	-7.0 [⋆]	7.2*			.42*	.65	29	8.9†	2502	.183
(87)	Philippines	(.085) .42 [†]	$\frac{(.14)}{28}$.008	(.12) 11	(2.3) -7.5^{\dagger}	(2.6) 7.8 *	32	$\frac{(.39)}{39}$.18	$\frac{(.26)}{.30^{+}}$	(.15)	(.47) 7.3 [†]	1629	.105
(01)	1 milippines	(.083)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(.15)	(.26)	(.16)	(.17)	(.52)	(.70)	1023	.100
(88)	Republic of Korea	.56 [†]	70	.33+	49*	-9.7 *	8.0	.70 [†]	.53	.24	.86	(.02)	7.7 [†]	1770	.181
(00)	Tepasie of Troice	(.12)	(.28)	(.17)	(.16)	(3.4)	(3.7)	(.21)	(.59)	(.32)	(.34)		(.71)	11.10	.101
(89)	Singapore	.46	-1.25^{\dagger}	.021	093	-1.09	1.58	066	25	.16	.34*	089	6.9^{\dagger}	2105	.105
()	0 1	(.057)	(.15)	(.080)	(.073)	(1.75)	(1.92)	(.13)	(.39)	(.10)	(.12)	(.087)	(.33)		
(90)	Sri Lanka	$.64^{\dagger}$	40^{\dagger}	.061	43^{\dagger}	61	1.49	067	92^{\dagger}	.25	.35	-1.41	6.8^{\dagger}	1848	.147
		(.075)	(.099)	(.100)	(.099)	(1.96)	(2.1)	(.17)	(.27)	(.098)	(.23)	(.86)	(.37)		
(91)	Taiwan	$.94^{\dagger}$	69^{\star}	$.57^{\dagger}$	42	-12.7^{\dagger}	13.1^{\dagger}	33	17	.33	.42		9.1^{\dagger}	776	.211
		(.12)	(.24)	(.17)	(.17)	(2.9)	(2.9)	(.26)	(.52)	(.28)	(.30)		(.59)		
(92)	Thailand	.20	46^{\star}	.28+	20	-3.9	2.7	.061	.18	19	.57+		7.2^{\dagger}	987	.053
(0.2)	T71 . 37	(.083)	(.17)	(.16)	(.14)	(3.2)	(3.5)	(.22)	(.35)	(.18)	(.31)		(.69)	1010	
(93)	Viet Nam	.32†	67 [†]	.26*	10	1.03	51	19	.039	.54†	.77†		5.8 [†]	1610	.159
⟨74-93⟩	Asia	(.054) .47 [†]	(.10) 60 [†]	(.080) .20 [†]	(.079) 19 [†]	(1.73) -2.5^{\dagger}	(1.75) 2.9 [†]	047	(.25) 32 [†]	(.092) .19 [†]	(.12) .38 [†]	.011	(.39) 7.1 [†]	39872	
(14-90)	Asia	(.014)	(.026)	(.021)	(.020)	-2.3 (.41)	(.45)	(.032)	(.058)	(.024)	(.038)	(.043)	(.091)	59012	
		(.011)	(.020)	(.021)	(.023)	(.11)	(.23)	(.002)	(.000)	(.021)	(.000)			on next	nage

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(\mathrm{age}/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	quoswr	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(94)	Algeria	.56 [†]	−.98 [†]	.49*	39 [†]	-5.1	6.3	.15	54 ⁺			49	7.6†	1054	.169
(95)	Angola	(.093)	(.14) 31	.39	.35	(2.5) 055	(3.0) 95	(.15)	(.32)	67*	-1.26^{\dagger}	(.97) 48	(.48) 4.5 [†]	417	.045
(30)	Migora	(.16)	(.26)	(.25)	(.25)	(5.0)	(6.2)			(.23)	(.31)	(.75)	(1.01)	411	.040
(96)	Benin	.19*	58^{\dagger}	.60 [†]	.15	.39	$\frac{(0.2)}{69}$	0008	.044	.56 [†]	.30	.41	3.4^{\dagger}	1279	.080
(00)		(.068)	(.11)	(.14)	(.11)	(1.97)	(2.3)	(.17)	(.22)	(.13)	(.37)	(.17)	(.55)		
(97)	Botswana		-1.00^{\dagger}	.70*	.13	-1.67	62	.22	.46	40^{+}	.064	4.3^{\dagger}	7.2^{\dagger}	634	.286
, ,		(.11)	(.20)	(.24)	(.19)	(2.6)	(2.8)	(.25)	(.32)	(.23)	(.38)	(.30)	(.59)		
(98)	Burkina Faso	$.46^{\dagger}$	56^{\dagger}	.29	066	-5.4^{\star}	6.3^{\star}	.32	.10	.17	.96*	84^{\dagger}	6.4^{\dagger}	721	.165
		(.061)	(.12)	(.24)	(.13)	(2.0)	(2.4)	(.16)	(.29)	(.13)	(.37)	(.16)	(.43)		
(99)	Burundi	$.49^{\dagger}$	80^{\dagger}	.098	.11	-1.54	.81	.008	.036	13	-4.5^{\dagger}	013	5.8^{\dagger}	840	.144
		(.064)	(.14)	(.20)	(.12)	(1.95)	(1.97)	(.20)	(.31)	(.19)	(.21)	(.52)	(.43)		
(100)	Cameroon	$.47^{\dagger}$	80^{\dagger}	.24	028	-4.1	3.4+	026	33^{+}	040	31		6.5^{\dagger}	2559	.158
(101)		(.044)	(.079)	(.10)	(.078)	(1.65)	(1.92)	(.097)	(.18)	(.085)	(.29)		(.38)		
(101)	Central African	$.74^{\dagger}$	37	−.44 *	7e-05	-5.2	7.8	.099	.14	$.43^{\dagger}$.84+		8.1^{\dagger}	879	.192
(4.00)	Republic	(.077)	(.15)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.6)	(3.5)	(.14)	(.25)	(.13)	(.44)		(.61)	2502	
(102)	Chad	.49 [†]	39 [†]	.43†	.12	2.2+	-2.7^{+}	0010	17	.052	.23		4.6^{\dagger}	2582	.223
(102)	C	(.046)	(.084)	(.11)	(.090)	(1.35)	(1.53)	(.13)	(.20)	(.083)	(.18)		(.32)	0.00	210
(103)	Congo	1.34	18	.82 [†]	.084	34	.34	.21	.66		25		8.5 [†]	863	.318
		(.091)	(.16)	(.21)	(.14)	(3.2)	(4.5)	(.18)	(.32)	(.16)	(.34)	Conti	(.57)		

		$\log(\text{household income})$	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	TMSoNP	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(104)	D.R. of the Congo	.33†	43 [†]	12	11	.60	-1.12	006	.056	.073	.70†		5.9 [†]	931	.077
(105)	Djibouti	$(.057)$ 1.03^{\dagger}	(.10) 49 [†]	.30	(.097) 044	(1.96)	$\frac{(2.3)}{-3.7}$	059	(.20) 19	.081	(.21) 1.20 *	1.07	(.48) 8.4 [†]	806	.198
(100)	Djibouii	(.092)	(.11)	(.13)	(.11)	(2.1)	(2.6)	(.15)	(.26)	(.12)	(.46)	(.72)	(.52)	000	.130
(106)	Ethiopia	.29†	26^{+}	.59†	080	.83	.64	11	.059	.54	.49	()	4.3 [†]	1378	.158
(/		(.069)	(.14)	(.13)	(.12)	(3.2)	(4.1)	(.15)	(.26)	(.12)	(.30)		(.67)		
(107)	Ghana	$.34^{\dagger}$	48^{\dagger}	.28+	.031	.12	89	21	26	.12	.50	.15	5.9^{\dagger}	1429	.096
		(.10)	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	(2.6)	(2.6)	(.23)	(.30)	(.14)	(.23)	(.47)	(.76)		
(108)	Kenya	$.52^{\dagger}$	69^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$	005	-3.4^{+}	3.0	.13	.12	054	040	82	6.3^{\dagger}	1449	.161
		(.056)	(.090)	(.14)	(.085)	(1.86)	(2.3)	(.11)	(.17)	(.098)	(.33)	(.32)	(.41)		
(109)	Liberia	$.26^{\dagger}$	46^{\star}	$.67^{\dagger}$.031	67	.067	.036	75^{+}	$.45^{\dagger}$	$\boldsymbol{1.23^{\dagger}}$.28	5.3^{\dagger}	942	.108
()		(.078)	(.18)	(.16)	(.17)	(2.6)	(3.0)	(.19)	(.42)	(.13)	(.31)	(1.06)	(.67)		
(110)	Madagascar	$.38^{\dagger}$	57^{\dagger}	.32	.065	-2.2	2.1	.19+	014	.10	.080	56	6.4^{\dagger}	1951	.112
(4.4.4)	25.1	(.045)	(.077)	(.16)	(.070)	(1.56)	(1.87)	(.10)	(.16)	(.080)	(.64)	(.27)	(.41)		
(111)	Malawi	$.33^{\dagger}$	22	23	.065	.67	21	19	19	.26+			6.1^{\dagger}	931	.053
(110)	3.5.11	(.076)	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(2.6)	(3.1)	(.18)	(.24)	(.15)	7 70 [†]	0.0†	(.58)	1500	000
(112)	Mali	.063	37 [†]	.45*	11	-3.8	4.0	.19	18	.39*	1.18†	.98†	4.1	1799	.036
(112)	М ::	(.061)	(.097)	(.14)	(.095)	(1.47)	(1.65)	(.14)	(.24)	(.15)	(.22)	(.17)	(.41)		120
(113)	Mauritania	.33†	67 [†]	12	073	4.4*	-4.0	33*	55*	.54	.98†	.17	5.2 [†]	2200	.136
		(.054)	(.099)	(.12)	(.090)	(1.71)	(1.98)	(.12)	(.19)	(.092)	(.24)	(.40)	(.54)		

		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL	constant	obs.	$R^2(\mathrm{adj})$
(114)	Mozambique	.64†	57 [†]	10	15 ⁺	2.6+	-3.8	093	28 ⁺	.16+	.31		7.2 [†]	1672	.195
(115)	Namibia	(.047) .30 [†]	(.091) 47 [†]	(.11) .53 [†]	$\frac{(.083)}{.16^{+}}$	(1.41)	(1.53) -2.1	$\frac{(.12)}{063}$	(.16) 11	(.093) .28 ⁺	.47+		(.35) 5.1 [†]	959	.113
(110)	rvaiiiibia	(.042)	(.12)	(.12)	(.099)	(1.51)	(1.59)	(.13)	(.20)	(.16)	(.26)		(.40)	303	.110
(116)	Niger	.22†	72^{\dagger}	.51†	051	-1.64	1.58	.19+	0009	.47	.64		4.9 [†]	1606	.093
(-)	8.	(.050)	(.088)	(.13)	(.083)	(1.33)	(1.57)	(.11)	(.22)	(.12)	(.44)		(.31)		
$\overline{(117)}$	Nigeria	.28†	65^{\dagger}	.26	010	18	.56	071	18	.15	1.07^{\dagger}		5.7^{\dagger}	1426	.075
		(.062)	(.10)	(.11)	(.12)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(.14)	(.28)	(.11)	(.29)	•	(.46)		
(118)	Rwanda	$.34^{\dagger}$	20	$.65^{\dagger}$.12	6.3*	-7.4^{*}	16	52^{+}	.37	1.52^{+}		4.7^{\dagger}	693	.140
-		(.062)	(.14)	(.19)	(.14)	(2.4)	(2.8)	(.19)	(.27)	(.16)	(.80)		(.50)		
(119)	Senegal	$\boldsymbol{.54}^{\dagger}$	60^{\dagger}	$m{.44}^\dagger$	24^{\star}	65	1.16	022	26^{+}	$.28^{\dagger}$	1.76^{\dagger}	026	6.5^{\dagger}	1872	.179
(100)	Ct. T	(.050)	(.082)	(.092)	(.075)	(1.36)	(1.51)	(.098)	(.16)	(.083)	(.38)	(.10)	(.34)	1010	
(120)	Sierra Leone	.095+	19^{+}	.22+	23	-2.6	2.5	.031	32	.37*	.67	-3.1^{\dagger}	7.7^{\dagger}	1813	.027
(121)	South Africa	.64 [†]	$(.12)$ 64^{\dagger}	.079	.033	(2.00) 62	.44	.012	.029	.13	(.31) .51	.029	(.58) 6.4 [†]	1627	.213
(121)	South Africa	(.051)	(.11)	(.11)	(.099)	02 (1.57)	(1.73)	(.13)		(.14)	(.21)	.029 (.47)		1027	.215
(122)	Sudan	.26 [†]	57 [†]	.29	20	$\frac{(1.37)}{-3.9^{+}}$	5.7	083	006	(.14)	(.21)	(.47)	(.39) 6.4 [†]	763	.052
(122)	Sadan	(.051)	(.14)	(.14)	(.12)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(.15)	(.32)				(.47)	100	.002
$\overline{(123)}$	Syrian Arab	.52 [†]	63*	.23	$\frac{(27)}{27^{+}}$	-4.3	5.6	.37	019			26	7.6 [†]	1167	.087
, ,	Republic	(.12)	(.20)	(.14)	(.14)	(3.2)	(4.2)	(.16)	(.28)			(.33)	(.65)		
				-			-					Conti	nued e	n novt	naga

(10.4)		log(household income)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	TMSoND	constant	sqo s	$\left R^2(\mathrm{adj}) \right $
(124)	Togo	.55 [†] (.069)	58 [†] (.10)	.21	.042	-1.53 (1.87)	1.26 (2.1)	.073	.13 (.21)	.31* (.11)	014 (.36)	1.94* (.64)	3.7 [†] (.78)	1343	.112
(125)	Tunisia	$\frac{(.009)}{012}$	$\frac{(.10)}{17}$	$\frac{(.14)}{75^{+}}$	003	-25.7^{\dagger}	30.1 [†]	.53	$\frac{(.21)}{-1.47}$	(.11)	(.30)	, ,	10.2 [†]	141	.194
(-)		(.12)	(.46)	(.41)	(.36)	(7.5)	(8.9)	(.41)	(1.08)			(.47)	(1.41)		
(126)	Uganda	.21*	47 [⋆]	.86 [†]	30	2.2	-3.4	.061	.33	$.60^{\dagger}$	1.99^{\dagger}		5.1^{\dagger}	906	.177
		(.075)	(.16)	(.16)	(.13)	(2.5)	(3.1)	(.19)	(.22)	(.13)	(.43)		(.55)		
(127)	Tanzania	$.44^{\dagger}$	62^{\dagger}	.22	.072	-3.4	3.3	.46*	.47+	.69 [†]	.47		5.3^{\dagger}	543	.192
		(.083)	(.15)	(.14)	(.15)	(4.1)	(5.4)	(.16)	(.24)	(.16)	(.55)		(.76)		
(128)	Zambia	$.25^{\dagger}$	58^{\dagger}	$.53^{\dagger}$.11	.98	-2.2	.13	094	.31*	.59*	-1.23	6.8^{\dagger}	2009	.114
		(.070)	(.12)	(.15)	(.12)	(2.2)	(2.7)	(.18)	(.27)	(.11)	(.21)	(.57)	(.79)		
(129)	Zimbabwe	$.38^{\dagger}$	68^{\dagger}	.34	068	-4.4^{+}	3.6	16	28	24	37		6.9^{\dagger}	1645	.099
(0.1.1.20)	A.C	(.061)	(.15)	(.27)	(.15)	(2.6)	(2.5)	(.17)	(.24)	(.23)	(.33)	10 [‡]	(.71)	45000	
$\langle 94\text{-}129 \rangle$	Africa	.41†	55^{\dagger}	.29†	035^{+}	70*	.47	.037	087*	.23†	$.20^{\dagger}$	19^{\dagger}	6.0^{\dagger}	45829	
(120)	To 4	(.010)	(.019)	(.023)	(.018)	(.33)	(.38)	(.024)	(.039)	(.021)	(.053)	(.057)	(.081)	1000	150
(130)	Egypt	.62†	87^{\dagger}	.28	−.79 [†]	-8.3	9.1	.47+	11	.062	.19	.57+	8.5 [†]	1069	.153
(191)	Inon	(.088)	(.15) 90 [†]	.20 ⁺	(.14) 46 [†]	(3.4) - 6.1 *	(3.5)	(.27)	.13	.16	.38+	(.33)	(.67)	1005	.125
(131)	Iran	.73†	(.12)				6.6*	.42*				.16	7.2 [†]	1905	.120
(132)	Israel	(.073) .82 [†]	73 [†]	$\frac{(.11)}{046}$.016	(2.2) -3.9^+	$\frac{(2.6)}{2.9}$.18	.019	.37	.43	(1.04) 13	(1.11) 8.5 [†]	1339	.125
(134)	151 ac1	(.099)	(.19)	(.11)	(.11)	-3.9 (2.1)	(2.2)	(.16)	(.25)	(.39)	(.40)		(.49)	1998	.120
		(.099)	(.19)	(.11)	(.11)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(.10)	(.∠∂)	(.39)	(.40)	(.15)	_ ` /		

C	^
H	\

$(134) \text{Lebanon} \qquad \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$				$\log(\text{household income})$	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	TMSoNb	constant	obs.	$R^2({ m adj})$
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		(133)	Jordan											_		969	.109
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(124)	Labanan		. ,	. ,	. ,						. ,	(1.99)	· /	206	.192
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	ట	(134)	Lebanon				_									890	.192
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	4	(135)	Oatar		<u> </u>		. ,		· /		. ,	. ,		1.02	· · ·	705	.212
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		(===)	Q		•												
$\langle 130\text{-}136 \rangle$ Persia and Mid-east (.035) (.065) (.048) (.045) (1.01) (1.17) (.064) (.13) (.069) (.088) (.13) (.23)		(136)	Saudi Arabia			. ,						. ,		. ,		1061	.0003
Mid-east (.035) (.065) (.048) (.045) (1.01) (1.17) (.064) (.13) (.069) (.088) (.13) (.23)				(.073)	(.17)	. ,	, ,	. ,	(3.8)	. ,	(.28)	(.12)		_	(.50)		_
		(130-136)												-		7944	
(.006) (.012) (.011) (.009) (.17) (.19) (.013) (.021) (.012) (.019) (.026) (.041)		$\langle 1\text{-}136 \rangle$	All countries	$.47^{\dagger}$	66^{\dagger}	$.25^{\dagger}$	12^{\dagger}	-3.5^{\dagger}	3.4^{\dagger}	.041*	15^{\dagger}	$.20^{\dagger}$	$.34^{\dagger}$	32^{\dagger}	7.4^{\dagger}	179714	




Table S-4: Global-level estimates for life evaluation.

Table S-5: Region-level estimates for life evaluation.

Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: $0.1\%^{\dagger}$ $1\%^{\star}$ 5% $10\%^{+}$

			log(household income)	not enough money (food)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	$q_{ m NoSML}$	constant net	country dummies	obs.	$R^2({ m adj})$ $N_{ m clusters}$
3 5	(1)	FSU and E Europe	$.38^{\dagger}$	90^{\dagger}		$.40^{\dagger}$		034^{+}	-6.6^{\dagger}	5.3^{\dagger}	.12	063	$.24^{\dagger}$	$.49^{\dagger}$	54^{\dagger} 7	7.8^{\dagger} $ imes$	3	3230.	$182\ 25$
			(.059)	(.075)		(.066)		(.019)	(.86)	(.85)	(.079)	(.084)	(.059)	(.11)	(.12)				
	(2)	FSU and E Europe	$.50^{\dagger}$	83^{\dagger}		$.37^{\dagger}$		046	-5.5^{\dagger}	4.5^{\dagger}	015	15^{\star}	$.19^{\dagger}$	$.45^{\dagger}$	40^{\dagger} 7	7.7^{\dagger} ×	✓ 3	3230.	$221\ 25$
			(.038)	(.048)		(.052)		(.019)	(.71)	\ /	(.047)	(.049)	(.047)	(.055)	(.058)	` ′			
	(3)	FSU and E Europe			82^{\dagger}		$.37^{\dagger}$	032^{+}	-6.6^{\dagger}	5.2^{\dagger}		084	$.23^{\dagger}$	$.47^{\dagger}$		7.9 [†] √	3	3230 .	$172\ 25$
	(4)	DOLL LD D	(.073)		(.048)		(.052)	(.019)	(.84)	(.83)	(.079)	(.084)	(.063)	(.12)	(.12)	` ′		2000	221 25
	(4)	FSU and E Europe			−.82 [†]		.36†	047	-5.5^{\dagger}	4.5^{\dagger}	015	15 [*]	.19†	$.45^{\dagger}$	40^{\dagger}		√ 3	3230 .	$221\ 25$
	<u>/F)</u>	D	(.041) .48 [†]	97^{\dagger}	(.048)	$.46^{\dagger}$	(.051)	(.019) 17 [†]	$(.71)$ -6.5^{\dagger}	(.70) 6.5 [†]	(.048) .22*	(.049) 11	(.046) .43*	(.055)	(.059)	` /	. 1	7200	308 22
	(5)	European Countries	(.099)	(.093)				(.033)	(.73)			(.055)	(.13)	$.44^{\dagger}$ (.12)	$65\frac{8}{(.27)}$. 1	1308.	308 22
	(6)	European	.34 [†]	94 [†]		(.12) .32 [†]		15 [†]	-6.1^{\dagger}	٠ /	(.081) .25 [†]	15^{\dagger}	.22 [†]	.34 [†]	016		./ 1	7308	365 22
	(0)	Countries	(.063)	(.091)		(.069)		(.031)	(.77)		(.061)	(.043)	(.064)	(.079)	(.090)		. • 1	1000.	000 22
	(7)	European	.56 [†]	(100-)	90^{\dagger}	(,	$.31^{\dagger}$	18^{\dagger}	` ′	6.6 [†]	.21*	13	.49*	.52 [†]	808	` ′	1	7308.	296 22
	()	Countries	(.11)	_	(.095)		(.064)	(.031)	(.75)	(.72)	(.082)	(.056)	(.15)	(.14)	(.34)				
	(8)	European	$.42^{\dagger}$		90^{\dagger}		$.32^{\dagger}$	15^{\dagger}	-6.1^{\dagger}		$.24^{\dagger}$	15^{\dagger}	$.23^{\dagger}$	$.35^{\dagger}$	010	6.8^{\dagger} \checkmark	√ 1	7308.	$363\ 22$
		Countries	(.073)		(.097)		(.068)	(.031)	(.77)	(.72)	(.062)	(.044)	(.064)	(.081)	(.090)	` /			
	(9)	USA, Canada,	.29 [†] -	-1.19^{\dagger}		$.28^{\dagger}$		28^{\dagger}	-8.0^{\dagger}	8.7^{\dagger}	.39*	13	056	056	27^{\dagger} 9	9.3^{\dagger} $ imes$		5502.	147 4
		Aus., and NZ													$\overline{\mathbf{C}}$	$\overline{\text{ontinu}}$	ied c	n nex	t page

	log(household income)	not enough money (food)	$ \ {\rm not\ enough\ money:\ food(net,national)} \\$	donated money	donated money (net,national)	male	age/100	$(age/100)^2$	(as) married	separated, divorced, or widowed	secondary education	tertiary education	dN_{OSWL}	constant net country dummies	obs.	$R^2({ m adj})$ N _{clusters}
	(.019)	(.082)		(.024)		(.081)	(1.03)	(.93)	(.13)	(.15)	(.067)	(.093)	(.075)			
(10) USA, Canada,		-1.18^{\dagger}		$.28^{\dagger}$		28^{\dagger}	-8.1^{\dagger}		.38*	14				$9.4^{\dagger} \times \checkmark$	5502.1	49 4
Aus., and NZ	(.019)	(.082)		(.031)		(.081)	(1.09)	. ,	(.13)	(.16)	(.082)	(.099)	(.013)			
(11) USA, Canada,	.41 [†]		-1.18^{\dagger}		$.28^{\dagger}$	28^{\dagger}	-8.0^{\dagger}	8.6 [↑]	.39*		074			9.4 [†] ✓	5502.1	46 4
Aus., and NZ	(.008)	_	(.076)		(.029)	(.081)	(1.03)	(.92)	(.13)	(.15)	(.065)	(.099)	(.099)	` ′		
(12) USA, Canada,	$.41^{\dagger}$		-1.18^{\dagger}		$.28^{\dagger}$	28^{\dagger}	-8.1^{\dagger}		.38*		027		40^{\dagger}		5502.1	49 4
Aus., and NZ	(.008)		(.078)		(.031)	(.082)	(1.09)	. ,	(.13)	(.16)	(.079)	(.10)	(.012)	. ,		
(13) Latin America and		81^{\dagger}		.21		18^{\dagger}	-4.6^{\dagger}	$4.1^{\scriptscriptstyle \intercal}$	075	19	$.36^{\dagger}$	$.63^{\dagger}$		7.5^{\dagger} \times	27693.1	$71\ 21$
Caribbean	(.063)	(.055)		(.083)	_	(.041)		(.77)	(.050)	(.078)	(.099)	(.11)	(.25)			
(14) Latin America and	$.38^{\dagger}$	70^{\dagger}		$.22^{\dagger}$		17^{\dagger}	-4.7^{\dagger}	4.2^{\dagger}	067^{+}	17^{\dagger}	$.43^{\dagger}$	$.70^{\dagger}$		8.0 [†] × ✓	27693.2	1921
Caribbean	(.058)	(.054)		(.032)		(.039)	(.77)		(.038)	(.041)	(.041)	(.070)	(.32)			
(15) Latin America and			68^{\dagger}		$.21^{\dagger}$	18^{\dagger}	-4.7^{\dagger}	4.2^{\dagger}	083	21	$.38^{\dagger}$	$.66^{\dagger}$		7.4^{\dagger} \checkmark	27693.1	6321
Caribbean	(.066)	_	(.055)		(.039)	(.041)	(.67)	(.79)	(.052)	(.088)	(.11)	(.11)	(.22)	` /		10.01
(16) Latin America and			68^{\dagger}		.20 [†]	16^{\dagger}	-4.8^{\dagger}	4.3^{\dagger}	068^{+}	17^{\dagger}	$.44^{\dagger}$	$.71^{\dagger}$	l	8.1 [†] √ √	27693.2	18 21
Caribbean	(.065)	= 0†	(.055)		(.034)	(.040)	(.76)	(.84)	(.038)	(.041)	(.041)	(.072)	(.33)	. ,	20050 1	07.00
(17) Asia	$.38^{\dagger}$	72^{\dagger}		$.25^{\dagger}$		18^{\dagger}	-3.1^{\dagger}	3.2^{\dagger}	.019	28^{\dagger}	.21*	$.38^{\dagger}$		6.8^{\dagger} $ imes$	39872 .1	87 20
(10) A :	(.043)	(.058)		(.047)		(.044)	(.78)	(.84)	(.051)	(.056)	(.065)	(.098)	(.20)			10.00
(18) Asia	$.46^{\dagger}$	64^{\dagger}		.21†		−.20 [†]		3.5^{\dagger}	011	28^{\dagger}	.21†	.46 [†]		6.6 [†] × ✓	39872.2	12 20
(10) A ·	(.041)	(.062)		(.029)	oo‡	(.041)	. ,	(.75)	(.050)	(.068)	(.033)	(.069)	(.23)		20070 1	70.00
(19) Asia	$.45^{\dagger}$		−.63 [†]		.22†	−.18 [†]	-3.1^{\dagger}	3.2	.010	31^{\dagger}	.22*	.36*		7.0 [†] ✓	39872 .1	
													C	Continued	on next	page

$\frac{3}{8}$	

	log(household income)	not enough money (food)	not enough money: food(net,national)	donated money donated money (net,national)	male	age/100 (age/100) ²	(as) married	separateu, uivorceu, or widowed secondary education	tertiary education	dNoSWL constant net country dummies	$\begin{aligned} & \text{obs.} \\ & R^2(\text{adj}) \\ & \text{N}_{\text{clusters}} \end{aligned}$
(20) 1	(.046)	_	(.060)	(.032)	(.044)	(.73) (.81)	(.046) (.06	/ /	(.11)	(.19) (.25)	
(20) Asia	.54†		−.63 [†]	.21	−.20 [†]	-3.1^{\dagger} 3.5^{\dagger}	015 <mark>29</mark>		.46†	19 6.6 [†] \checkmark \checkmark 398	72.21120
(01) A f	(.046)	C1†	(.063)	(.029)	(.041)	(.69) $(.75)$ 48 $.22$	0.050 0.070 0.070 0.08 0.08	/ /	(.069)	(.23) (.23)	704 120 22
(21) Africa	.31†	61 [†]		.35†	008				.66†		704 .130 32
(22) Africa	(.034) .32 [†]	(.047) 56 [†]		(.061) .31 [†]	(.026) 005	(.55) $(.57)$ 82 $.48$	(.084) $(.09$ $.07003$	/ /	(.16) .55 [†]	(.28) (.31) $.20^{}_{}5.3^{\dagger}_{} \times \checkmark 427$	04 .182 32
(22) Affica	(.032)	(.037)		(.052)	(.026)	(.50) $(.51)$	(.067) (.079		(.13)	(.29) (.27)	04.102.02
(23) Africa	.38 [†]	(.037)	53^{\dagger}	.30 [†]	005	51 .25	.04305	/ /	.71 [†]	· / · /	704 .120 32
(20) 1111100	(.036)		(.040)	(.055)	(.027)	(.57) (.59)	(.086) (.19		(.16)	(.29) (.32)	01.12002
(24) Africa	.39		54^{\dagger}	.30†	006	82 .49	.07103	/ /	.57†	$.20$ 5.1 [†] \checkmark \checkmark 427	04 .180 32
	(.037)	_	(.040)	(.052)	(.026)	(.51) (.51)	(.067) (.079		(.13)	(.29) (.26)	
(25) Persia and	$.53^{\dagger}$	89^{\dagger}		$.17^{\dagger}$	−.34 *	$-3.4^{+} 3.8^{+}$.13 .00	24+	$.53^{\dagger}$	$.47 \frac{6.9^{\dagger}}{} \times 79$	044.186 7
Mid-east	(.11)	(.10)	•	(.050)	(.11)	(1.99) (2.2)	(.14) $(.24)$	3) (.14)	(.15)	(.51) (.28)	
(26) Persia and	$.57^{\dagger}$	80^{\dagger}		.16	34^{\star}	-3.1 3.0	.0981	8 .047	.27	.80 [†] 7.5 [†] × ✓ 79	044.242 7
Mid-east	(.10)	(.081)		(.076)	(.11)	(2.1) (2.4)	(.14) $(.11)$	/ /	(.12)	(.22) (.48)	
(27) Persia and	.62 [†]		75^{\dagger}	.17	−.35 *	$-3.5^{+} 3.9^{+}$.1201	$2 .28^{+}$.59†	.38 <mark>6.9[†] √</mark> 79	944.177 7
Mid-east	(.12)	_	(.098)	(.085)	(.11)	(2.0) (2.2)	(.14) $(.24)$	· · · ·	(.16)	(.56) $(.32)$	
(28) Persia and	.66 [†]		78^{\dagger}	.15	34^{\star}	-3.1 3.0	.0971	8 .058	.29	. 79[†] 7.7[†] √ √ 79	044.241 7
Mid-east	(.11)		(.096)	(.068)	(.11)	(2.1) (2.4)	(.14) $(.11)$	9) (.096)	(.11)	(.22) $(.53)$	